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SHORTCUTS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
KERRI LYNN STONE* 
ABSTRACT 
Are employment discrimination plaintiffs viewed by society and by judges 
with an increased skepticism?  This Article urges that the same actor inference, 
the stray comment doctrine, and strict temporal nexus requirements, as courts 
have applied them, make up a larger and dangerous trend in the area of 
employment discrimination jurisprudence—that of courts reverting to special, 
judge-made “shortcuts” to curtail or even bypass analysis necessary to justify 
the disposal or proper adjudication of a case.  This shorthand across different 
doctrines reveals a willingness of the judiciary to proxy monolithic 
assumptions for the individualized reasoned analyses mandated by the relevant 
antidiscrimination legislation.  This Article contrasts the shortcuts trend in 
employment discrimination jurisprudence with those presumptions and 
inferences that have traditionally been afforded to plaintiffs suing under 
traditional tort law.  It also explores the potential root causes of the skepticism 
and hostility with which judges have regarded employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, as opposed to the way in which they have regarded traditional tort 
plaintiffs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research confirms everyday observations of how much more difficult it is 
for employment discrimination plaintiffs than for other plaintiffs to survive 
pre-trial motions to dismiss their cases and to win at trial or on appeal.1  
Indeed, recent studies confirm that judicial hostility toward Title VII claims is 
on the rise.2  In one recently conducted evaluation and analysis of federal civil 
cases filed between 1970 and 2006, the authors found that employment 
discrimination claims that go before a bench are more likely than other kinds 
of claims to fail, both at the district court and at the appellate level.3 
 
 1. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004) (“Employment 
discrimination plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe.  They manage many fewer happy resolutions 
early in litigation, and so they have to proceed toward trial more often.  They win a lower 
proportion of cases during pretrial and at trial.  Then, more of their successful cases are appealed.  
On appeal, they have a harder time upholding their successes and reversing adverse outcomes.”); 
Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (analyzing statistics of 615 ADA cases terminated between 1992 and 
1998 and finding that 92.7% of those cases were won by defendants, and of those, 38.7% were 
resolved on summary judgment); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: 
The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 
205–06 (1993) (observing the difficulties that employment discrimination plaintiffs face on 
summary judgment); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 897–900, 899 n.49 (2006) (discussing statistics demonstrating that 
employment discrimination plaintiffs are seldom successful); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 
709–10 (2007) (observing that 73% of summary judgment motions in employment discrimination 
cases are granted, and that nearly all are in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi, Why Are 
Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 574–75 (2001) (arguing 
that “employment discrimination cases are unusually difficult to win, contrary to the reigning 
perspective, and that the various biases courts bring to the cases deeply affect how courts analyze 
and decide cases”); Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to the 
Honorable Michael Baylson, U. S. Dist. Court Judge, E. Dist. of Pa. (June 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf (analyzing 17,969 cases 
terminated in the seventy-eight federal district courts and finding that 73% of summary judgment 
motions in employment discrimination cases are granted, while the average for all civil cases is 
just 60%). 
 2. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) 
(documenting various statistics that led the authors to conclude that judges harbor anti-plaintiff 
views); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery 
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
65, 95 (2010) (“Recent studies indicate that judicial hostility to Title VII claims in particular 
continues.”). 
 3. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 105–06, 127, 130 (“Employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, unlike most other plaintiffs, have always done substantially worse in judge trials than in 
jury trials.  In numbers, employment discrimination plaintiffs have won only 19.62% of judge 
trials.  While employment discrimination plaintiffs have thus won fewer than one in five of their 
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The authors also found that the majority of appeals in federal employment 
discrimination cases are made by plaintiffs, a statistic that they claim “mainly 
reflects that plaintiffs suffer most of the losses at the district court level.”4  
Moreover, while the appeal rates of plaintiffs and defendants parallel one 
another, “plaintiffs’ appeals (12,608) are ten times more frequent in absolute 
numbers than defendants’ appeals (1260).”5  More salient is the fact that the 
reversal rate of defendants on appeal is much greater than that of plaintiffs, 
with the respective rates for defendants and plaintiffs from victories at the 
pretrial adjudication stage being 30% versus 11%, and the respective rates 
from trial stage wins being 41% versus 9%.6  The study’s authors, Professor 
Kevin Clermont and Dean Stewart J. Schwab, have discerned what they call an 
“anti-plaintiff effect,” whereby employment discrimination plaintiffs appear to 
be systemically disadvantaged by judicial skepticism toward the plausibility of 
what they are alleging.7 
This effect is manifest in the “shortcut” doctrines that premise often lethal 
inferences against employment discrimination plaintiffs on simplistic 
caricatures of the mechanics of human behavior and workplace dynamics.  A 
“shortcut,” as the term is used in this Article, may be defined as a label or 
inference that proxies for reasoned analysis.  Shortcuts unfairly skew toward a 
defendant’s case by permitting or compelling a trier to make unwarranted 
assumptions or to attach undue significance to a single fact or facet of a case.  
This is done at the expense of a more holistic assessment of all properly-
considered evidence against the backdrop of the overarching question posed by 
the relevant legislation: did employment discrimination “because” of an 
unlawful consideration occur?  This Article will focus on a critique of several 
shortcuts, the same actor inference, the stray comment doctrine, and various 
 
judge trials, other plaintiffs have won 45.53% of their judge trials.”); see also Kevin M. Clermont 
& Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from 
Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 958 (2002) (“Job discrimination plaintiffs are 
one of the least successful classes of plaintiffs at the trial court level.”). 
 4. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 109. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 111. 
 7. Id. at 112–13; see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Is it the “Real Thing”? How Coke’s One-
Way Binding Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 77, 93–94 (2009) (noting that (1) “the vast majority of employment discrimination 
cases that come up on appeal involve claims of intentional discrimination—which require 
credibility determinations usually subject to greater deferential review”; (2) “there is no reason to 
believe that plaintiffs’ employment attorneys—who labor under the same economic pressures to 
succeed under contingency fee agreements—are more inclined to bring frivolous cases than other 
plaintiffs’ attorneys”; and (3) “those cases that survive the gauntlet of procedural hurdles—
motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and trial—and do not settle are non-frivolous, close 
matters that one would expect could go either way: reversal or affirmance”). 
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temporal nexus requirements, as they have evolved and exist in the law of 
employment discrimination. 
Federal employment discrimination statutes typically prohibit 
discrimination “because of” protected class membership.8  However, stringent 
temporal nexus and context requirements to which judges subject comments 
alleged to evince bias reveal courts’ insular views as to how discriminatory 
bias is fomented and expressed.  Numerous courts dismiss or discount 
comments that appear to evince protected class-based bias as “stray” pursuant 
to their jurisdictions’ view that the timing or context of an utterance must 
coalesce nearly perfectly with an adverse employment action for it to have 
evidentiary value.9  This represents a fragmented view of human nature and the 
formation and expression of bias; it gives voice to a belief that one’s biased 
comment made mere days or weeks prior to an action can be said to yield little 
to no insight into one’s beliefs, motivations, or intentions. 
On the other hand, there is the so-called “same actor inference,” pursuant 
to which courts have held that an inference of an absence of discriminatory 
intent arises when the same person hires or promotes a protected class member 
and then later fires her.10  Despite the multitude of reasons as to why one with 
some level of bias may hire or promote a protected class member, and despite 
the ways in which bias may form, evolve, or manifest itself during the passage 
of years, courts have persisted in applying the same actor inference.  This 
inference, like the stray comment doctrine, operates without any grounding in a 
refined understanding of human behavior, interpersonal dynamics, or the 
formation and expression of bias.  As opposed to an assumption that one’s 
words cannot evince the bias one is alleged to have had mere weeks later, the 
inference inexplicably creates an assumption that a single act evinces a mindset 
that one should be presumed to have years later. 
This Article aims to do several things.  First, it urges that the doctrines 
described above—the same actor inference, the stray comment doctrine, and 
strict temporal nexus requirements—should be seen today, as courts have 
applied them, as comprising a larger and dangerous trend in the area of 
employment discrimination jurisprudence—that of courts reverting to special, 
judge-made “shortcuts” to curtail or even bypass analysis necessary to justify 
the disposal or proper adjudication of a case.  While some aspects of these 
doctrines have been critiqued individually,11 when they are viewed together 
 
 8. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (Title VII). 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. See, e.g., Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006); Proud 
v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 11. See, e.g., Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains 
Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (same-actor 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] SHORTCUTS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 115 
and framed as part of a larger pathology, the large themes that define this trend 
emerge and underscore the need for judicial vigilance and reform.  So, for 
example, each shortcut uses broad-brush assumptions about how human beings 
act, reason, and express themselves either to foreclose what might be valuable 
evidence from consideration automatically or to erect an inference—which 
some judges will treat as a presumption12—against a plaintiff’s case before her 
evidence is even proffered.  This shorthand across different doctrines reveals a 
willingness of the judiciary to substitute monolithic assumptions for the 
individualized reasoned analyses mandated by the relevant legislation. 
Second, this Article contrasts the shortcuts trend in employment 
discrimination jurisprudence with those presumptions and inferences that have 
traditionally been afforded to plaintiffs suing under traditional tort law.  
Obviously, the circumstances under which plaintiff-oriented inferences and 
presumptions are properly invoked in tort law are not completely analogous to 
those in most employment discrimination cases.  Nonetheless, courts’ stated 
rationales for affording them reinforce the idea that there ought to be judicial 
sensitivity to the less-than-ideal situation of plaintiffs in certain types of cases 
to gather the evidence that they will need to prevail.  Moreover, while nothing 
about tort law “shortcuts” that favor plaintiffs compels the genesis of similar 
shortcuts in employment discrimination law, they should compel a rethinking 
of the defendant-favoring shortcuts that exist.  There ought to be more of a 
judicial disinclination to substitute a platitude or rote cutoff for a 
comprehensive analysis where an employment discrimination plaintiff tries to 
proffer admissible, probative evidence. 
Third, this Article explores the potential root causes of the skepticism and 
hostility with which judges have regarded employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, as opposed to the way in which they have regarded traditional tort 
plaintiffs (at least as evidenced by judge-made doctrines).13  Awareness of and 
vigilance to this phenomenon is crucial to a more evenhanded treatment of 
employment discrimination plaintiffs by courts and by jurisprudence going 
forward. 
 
inference); Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 
ALA. L. REV. 773, 791–92 (2010) (stray remarks doctrine); Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A 
Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 76 MO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (stray remarks doctrine). 
 12. Although inferences and presumptions are wholly distinct concepts, with a presumption 
being traditionally defined as an assumption of fact compelled by the law under certain 
circumstances, and an inference being a logical deduction, courts have often and continually 
conflated or confused the two concepts using “imprecise language.”  Nazir v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 321–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see also Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in 
Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 382–83 (2010) (discussing Nazir). 
 13. See infra Part IV.E. 
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Ultimately, this Article advocates for a reconciliation of employment 
jurisprudence with a realistic view of human behavior so that the narratives 
that underlie the jurisprudence comport with a holistic, integrated, realistic 
view of human beings and the interplay among their beliefs, motivations, 
expressions, and actions.  Simplistic narratives such as “someone who hires a 
member of a group should be presumed to act without bias toward that group 
or its members,” or “as a matter of law, if he were to retaliate he would needed 
to have done it by X date,” and the shortcuts that they buttress, have no place in 
employment discrimination law, especially at the summary judgment stage.  
While there is nothing wrong with a judge—or a jury—concluding that, upon 
consideration of all appropriate evidence, a plaintiff’s case is not tenable, 
analysis and a focus on relevant queries, rather than shortcuts, ought to pave 
the road to that conclusion. 
A WORD ABOUT SHORTCUTS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
For decades, scholars who evaluate employment discrimination 
jurisprudence have consistently bemoaned “the gradual and continuing erosion 
of the factfinder’s role in federal employment discrimination cases and its 
replacement by an increasing use of summary judgment through which the 
courts make pretrial determinations formerly reserved for the factfinder at 
trial,”14 alluding to “courts’ willingness to continue to compartmentalize 
various aspects of plaintiff’s proof to find that none is sufficient,”15 and the 
common practice of courts in “slicing and dicing away the probative value of 
the evidence of the prima facie case, of the falsity of [the] defendant’s 
explanation and of . . . [discriminatory] statements.”16  These scholars have 
accused judges, especially those adjudicating cases with female or minority 
plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination, of, in the course of deciding 
summary judgment motions, parsing “law and fact in a technical and 
mechanistic way without evaluating the broad context on an arid record,”17 and 
“promoting form over substance in the quest to define civil rights, applying 
formalistic rigidity to a complex and elusive phenomenon like workplace 
 
 14. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 1, at 203, 206 (observing that “[c]ivil rights are under 
siege,” discussing a “misapplication of civil procedural rules to employment discrimination cases 
[that] threatens substantive anti-discrimination law,” and noting that “[t]his trend . . . substantially 
undermines the efficacy of the nation’s laws against discrimination”). 
 15. Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by 
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 216 n.93 (2009) (observing that such willingness “is directly 
contrary to the holistic approach to evaluating evidence of discrimination that the [Supreme] 
Court require[s]”). 
 16. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 577, 585 (2001) (calling “such slicing and dicing of all of plaintiff’s evidence . . . the death 
knell for the McDonnell Douglas approach”). 
 17. Schneider, supra note 1, at 729. 
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discrimination.”18 Despite these entreaties, however, as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the 
jurisprudence that has grown up around them move into their sixth decade of 
existence, the law of employment discrimination remains as confused and 
unfocused as ever, seemingly moving away from, rather than toward the 
statutes’ goals of eradicating workplace discrimination.19 
Although this Article takes aim at shortcuts generally, it should be noted 
that in most of the cases discussed in connection with the various shortcuts, the 
shortcut has been invoked at the summary judgment phase of litigation.20  This 
adds an additional dimension to the difficulties posed by the already-
problematic shortcuts, despite the fact that, in theory, each shortcut’s effect at 
summary judgment should be the same as it would be at trial. 
Indeed, if a facet of a proffered comment will render it ineligible for 
consideration by a jury at trial, or insufficient (even when considered alongside 
all other evidence) as a matter of law to raise a triable issue, it is proper for a 
court to discount it, and perhaps to grant summary judgment.  However, as 
discussed, courts deciding summary judgment motions in employment 
discrimination cases often view evidence in a piecemeal manner.21  They do 
things like disregard discrete pieces of evidence, often based on nothing more 
than a hastily-affixed label like “stray.”22  They often resultantly determine that 
triable issues may not be discerned as a matter of law, bypassing analysis or 
explanation as they prematurely foreclose a viable case. 
Furthermore, when, a shortcut is as incoherent and amorphous as the stray 
comment doctrine, for example, it further enables improper grants of summary 
judgment that are deficient in reasoning, if not also in result.  Because the 
doctrine is not really, as will be discussed, a unified rule or theory, courts 
impute a variety of meanings and significance to the word “stray” on summary 
judgment.23  One court may use it as shorthand to mean “not relevant” without 
further establishing or justifying this assertion.  If this is, in fact, the case, then 
that court will properly disregard the evidence on summary judgment, but will 
not furnish a necessary attendant explanation. 
 
 18. Martin, supra note 12, at 329. 
 19. See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 71, 124 
(2011) (observing that “the key question in modern discrimination cases is often whether the 
plaintiff can cram his or her facts into a recognized structure and not whether the facts establish 
discrimination,” and that “employment discrimination law is held captive by [an] increasingly 
complicated web of frameworks, which facilitate a reflexive, formalistic view of discrimination”). 
 20. See, e.g., Mieczkowski v. York City Sch. Dist., 414 F. App’x 441, 448 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255, 261–62 (6th Cir. 2002); Watkins v. 
Johnson, No. 3:10-cv-00025, 2010 WL 5479169, at *4–5 (W.D. La. Dec. 30, 2010). 
 21. See infra Part IV.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
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Another court, however, may use the label “stray” to mean “insufficient,” 
standing alone, to establish a triable issue of fact, and then disregard the 
comment (in whole or in part) despite the fact that it does not stand alone as 
evidence.  Still another court may simply affix the label and, on summary 
judgment, proceed to devalue or wholly discount the evidence without any 
elucidation as to what it is doing or why.  Each of these scenarios is clearly 
undesirable in the summary judgment context because the court is not, as it 
should be, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and 
examining all appropriate evidence, satisfying itself that the case may not 
proceed as a matter of law. 
At least when shortcuts are presented to juries as inferences or queries 
(such as when a court instructs a jury that it may infer a lack of discriminatory 
intent from the same actor inference or when it defines the word “stray,” but 
lets the jury determine the strength of admissible evidence), the jury will, 
presumably, get to hear all admissible evidence and determine the strength of 
that inference, as well as whether and when it is rebutted.  As the Eleventh 
Circuit has noted, “it is the province of the jury rather than the court . . . to 
determine whether the inference generated by ‘same actor’ evidence is strong 
enough to outweigh a plaintiff’s evidence of pretext.”24  Moreover, several of 
the few published opinions that address the stray comment doctrine in the 
context of a trial rather than of summary judgment seem to acknowledge that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than parties’ characterizations of the 
strength of evidence, ought to govern admissibility.25 
Instead, on summary judgment, the often sloppy use of an ambiguous 
“shortcut” term like “stray” may permit the substitution of judges’ personal 
evaluations of evidence for that which a reasonable juror could conclude.  The 
discounting of potentially helpful evidence combined with undue strength 
accorded to the same actor inference may result in the premature and unjust 
foreclosure of a case.  Shortcuts, because they are cloaked in the mantle of 
official doctrines, appear to allow large-scale assumptions that on summary 
judgment are often held up as ineluctable truths.  They accomplish this very 
succinctly and without very much hashing of evidence, making them further 
contravene the statutory schemes and goals of the employment discrimination 
statutes being utilized. 
 
 24. Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir.1998). 
 25. Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2006); see also 
Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521–22 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Of course, the district 
court must also keep in mind . . . that stray remarks are not categorically excludable even though 
not directly connected to the particular employment decision at issue.”); Harris v. Wackenhut 
Servs., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 53, 61–62, 61 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The Court agrees with the 
plaintiff that stray remarks may be probative of discriminatory intent . . . .”); EEOC v. Schott N. 
Am., Inc., No. 06cv1246, 2009 WL 310897, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2009) (applying general 
evidentiary principles to stray remarks). 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
This Article focuses primarily on cases brought by employment 
discrimination plaintiffs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).27  Under Title 
VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”28 
To allege a claim of intentional disparate treatment under the statute, a 
plaintiff may show either that discrimination was the only factor engendering 
an employment decision, or, under the 1991 amendments to the Act, that it was 
a “motivating factor,”29 although in the latter instance, a plaintiff’s remedies 
may be limited.30  Courts seeking to ascertain whether an action was taken 
“because of” a plaintiff’s protected class status or whether a defendant’s 
proffered reason is viable often employ the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green31 burden-shifting framework.  In the course of this analysis, the plaintiff 
initially sets forth a prima facie case that she experienced unlawful 
discrimination.32  This usually consists of evidence that the plaintiff belongs to 
a protected class, that she was satisfactorily performing her job duties, that she 
suffered an adverse employment action, and that it happened under 
circumstances giving rise to a legitimate inference of unlawful 
discrimination.33  Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a 
 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 29. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when 
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (“On a claim in which an individual proves a violation 
under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would 
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court . . . 
shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, 
promotion, or payment . . . .”). 
 31. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 32. Id. at 802. 
 33. See, e.g., Seeney v. Elwyn, Inc., 409 F. App’x 570, 573 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“A 
prima facie case is established where the plaintiff shows that (1) she is a member of a protected 
class; (2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered an adverse employment 
action; and (4) that adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination.”); Galdwin v. Pozzi, 403 F. App’x 603, 605 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In order to make out 
a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination, [plaintiff] must allege the following four 
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.34  Lastly, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must ultimately persuade the trier of 
fact that the rationale proffered by the defendant is a mere pretext for 
discrimination.35 
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified Title VII’s so-called 
“mixed-motive” theory, and it became clear that a plaintiff could prevail in her 
case where she could show that an improper consideration was “a motivating 
factor” for an adverse employment action.36  If, however, the defendant can 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same 
action even absent the impermissible motivating factor, the plaintiff’s relief 
may be limited.37  Courts evinced confusion as to when a so-called mixed 
motive instruction was appropriate, with some holding that McDonnell 
Douglas remained the proper framework for use only when they were 
adjudicating cases that lacked “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent.38 
 
elements: (1) she falls within a protected class, (2) she was performing her duties satisfactorily, 
(3) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse employment action 
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”). 
 34. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 35. Id. at 804; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) 
(“‘[T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’  And . . . to satisfy this 
burden, the plaintiff . . . must be afforded the ‘opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a 
pretext for discrimination.’” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 
(1981))). 
 36. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 38. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397 (6th Cir. 2008) (“For the first 
decade after the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), many federal courts required a Title VII 
plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim under this section to produce direct, as opposed to 
circumstantial, evidence that consideration of a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in 
the challenged employment decision.”); see also, e.g., Haddon v. Exec. Residence at the White 
House, 313 F.3d 1352, 1357–59 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (determining that absent direct evidence of 
retaliation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) properly applied the 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 
1089, 1096 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) (“In a ‘mixed-motives’ or Price Waterhouse case, the employee 
must produce direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., more direct evidence than is required for the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case.” (citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 
778 (3d Cir. 1994); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994)); 
Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995) (“To earn a mixed-motive instruction . . . 
requires ‘direct evidence . . . .’” (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring))), abrogated by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); cf. 
Buchsbaum v. Univ. Physicians Plan, 55 F. App’x 40, 44–45 (3d Cir. 2002) (“While a motion for 
summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim under the ADA or the ADEA is 
typically considered under the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas, the 
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In 2004, the Supreme Court held that to establish a jury question as to a § 
703(m) “mixed motive” violation, “a plaintiff need only present sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice.’”39  This should have obviated the need 
for courts to try to distinguish between direct and indirect evidence,40 but 
courts persist in their confusion as to the type and strength of evidence needed 
to make out a Title VII claim, varying in their interpretations of what 
constitutes “direct evidence,”41 and what is required to make out a successful 
discrimination case.42 
 
‘mixed motive’ analysis of Price Waterhouse may be applied instead if the plaintiff has produced 
‘direct evidence’ of the employer’s discriminatory animus.” (citation omitted)). 
 39. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 40. See id. at 98–99; see also B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REV. 439, 463–64 
(2008) (“In Desert Palace . . . the Supreme Court . . . made clear that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
amendments eliminated any distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence 
cases that Price Waterhouse might have implied.” (footnote omitted)); Thomas F. Kondro, 
Comment, Mixed Motives and Motivating Factors: Choosing a Realistic Summary Judgment 
Framework for § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1439, 1455 (2010) (noting the 
“abolishment of the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence[] for purposes of 
evaluating mixed-motive claims”). 
 41. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1053 (8th Cir. 2011) (Colloton, J., 
concurring) (noting the “confusion that has arisen from efforts to apply a ‘direct evidence’ 
standard”).  Compare Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Direct 
evidence . . . is not the converse of circumstantial evidence, as many seem to assume.  Rather, 
direct evidence is evidence ‘showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus 
and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an 
illegitimate criterion actually motivated’ the adverse employment action.” (quoting Thomas v. 
First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997))), with Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 
1132, 1138–39 (8th Cir. 2007) (Shepherd, J., concurring in part and writing separately in part) 
(disagreeing that “circumstantial evidence” is part of the “direct evidence” analysis under 
Griffith). 
 42. See White, 533 F.3d at 398 (“Since Desert Palace, the federal courts of appeals have, 
without much, if any, consideration of the issue, developed widely differing approaches to the 
question of how to analyze summary judgment challenges in Title VII mixed-motive cases.”); 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is not entirely clear 
exactly what this evidence must be, but nothing in Price Waterhouse suggests that a certain type 
or quantity of evidence is required to prove a prima facie case of discrimination.”).  Compare 
Calhoun v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 1259, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Where, as here, the plaintiff lacks 
direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, we analyze her claims under the framework of 
McDonnell Douglas . . . .”), and Paup v. Gear Prods., Inc., 327 F. App’x 100, 117 (10th Cir. 
2009) (“Where, as here, a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, she may carry 
her burden ‘by presenting circumstantial evidence in accord with the familiar McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework.’” (quoting Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 
1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008))), with Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 
284–85 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the employee may proceed by (1) “demonstrating through 
direct or circumstantial evidence that sex or age discrimination motivated the employer’s adverse 
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Under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, an employer is prohibited from 
retaliating against an employee because she opposed practices made unlawful 
by Title VII or because she “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter.”43  Typically, to make out a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 
show that she engaged in protected activity and that this protected activity 
caused the relevant decision maker to confer an adverse employment action 
upon her.44 
Under the ADEA, an employer may not discriminate against an employee 
because of that employee’s age, and employees who are forty years old or 
older merit protection.45  The Supreme Court, in what has been a controversial 
decision,46 held in 2009 that to bring a successful disparate treatment claim 
under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that her age was not merely one cause, but rather the “but-for” cause of the 
adverse employment action that befell her.47  The Court found that: 
[u]nlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may 
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.  
Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it 
amended Title VII to add §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), even though it 
contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways.48 
This holding has made it much more difficult for ADEA plaintiffs to prove age 
discrimination under the statute.49 
 
employment decision,” or (2) by “establishing a prima facie case” through McDonnell Douglas), 
and Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
“Desert Palace is entirely consistent with our precedent under which a plaintiff survives 
summary judgment either by providing direct evidence of discrimination or by creating an 
inference of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas framework”). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 44. See, e.g., Burnell v. Gates Rubber Co., 647 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Burnell must 
provide evidence that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, that he suffered a materially 
adverse employment action, and that the former caused the latter.”). 
 45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (2006). 
 46. See, e.g., Jim Goh, Caught in the Judicial-Congressional Tug of War: Making Sense of 
Recent and Upcoming Supreme Court Decisions and Congressional Legislation, in EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 2010: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 19, 22, 
24 (2010) (stating that “there is congressional activity afoot to repudiate the decision”); Michael 
Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services—Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 681, 685–86 
(2010) (arguing that the Gross majority ignored precedent). 
 47. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009). 
 48. Id. at 2349. 
 49. See, e.g., Foreman, supra note 46, at 688 (“Gross significantly changed the rules of the 
game for those attempting to prove age discrimination.  Plaintiffs now face uncertain standards at 
summary judgment, an onerous burden at trial, and new concerns in pleading age 
discrimination.”).  See generally Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal 
Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil 
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As per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is only proper for a court to 
grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”50  When a judge adjudicates a motion for summary judgment, he or she 
must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and 
must draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.51  To survive the motion, 
however, the non-movant must “produce admissible evidence containing 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”52  As will be 
discussed, the presence of “shortcuts” in employment discrimination law and 
particularly their misuse or misapplication can hinder a non-movant plaintiff’s 
entitlement to have a court fully evaluate all appropriate evidence in the light 
most favorable to her. 
II.  JUDGE-MADE “SHORTCUTS” TO HELP DISPENSE WITH AND DISPOSE OF 
CASES 
“Courts take a snapshot of the plaintiff’s work life before and after the 
alleged adverse employment action, search for a common thread, and assign 
meaning without any regard for the powerful human and institutional forces at 
work.”53 
Despite the fact that Title VII’s broad remedial goals are articulated so 
clearly and steeped in so much history, judges have taken it upon themselves to 
craft strictures that serve to bar or impede certain cases not barred by any 
language in the statute or any procedural rule.54 These artificially-drawn 
bright-lines, inferences, and cutoffs—“shortcuts”—are clearly designed to help 
screen out cases that judges feel are too tenuous with respect to causation or 
state of mind.  However, these doctrines operate, often at the summary 
judgment level, to help judges screen out cases based on a mechanistic 
application of a rigid rule when a reasonable trier of fact, assessing the totality 
 
Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69 (2010) (discussing courts’ historical treatment of ADEA 
causation, critiquing the Gross majority opinion, and positing appropriate legislative response to 
Gross). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 51. Mitchell v. Gershen, No. 10-1956, 2011 WL 2134341, at *1 (3d Cir. May 31, 2011). 
 52. Id. (quoting Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 53. Martin, supra note 11, at 1121. 
 54. See id. at 1120 (“Efforts to explore the circumstantial terrain for meaningful markers of 
discriminatory conduct have produced various interpretational sideshows; formulations that often 
bear no connection to modern workplace realities.  These judicial maneuvers have diminished the 
statute’s effectiveness as a shield for workers from the venom of discrimination.”). 
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of the evidence to ascertain an elusive truth, could, in fact, be persuaded of the 
plaintiff’s claim.55 
These “shortcuts” can operate systemically to disadvantage employment 
discrimination plaintiffs who attempt to prove that an adverse employment 
action befell them “because of” their protected class status or protected 
activity.56  Their claims may be prematurely foreclosed or hindered without 
ample analysis or explanation because a “shortcut” has been applied against 
the credibility of the narrative that they are attempting to tell,57 because the 
chronology of their story failed to adhere to an arbitrary temporal cutoff 
between the time a comment was uttered and the moment that an adverse 
action was taken,58 or because a comment, alleged to be indicative of a given 
mindset, is determined to be a misspeak or somehow too insignificant to merit 
evaluation.59 
Each “shortcut” is rooted in a deceptively simple logic that attempts to 
narrate the ways in which the human mind works and the ways in which 
human beings will react in given situations.  This monolithic approach to 
disregarding evidence and, ultimately, whole cases, lacks the nuance and 
complexity necessitated by a query as intricate as that posed by Title VII: Was 
this plaintiff treated differently with respect to the terms and conditions of her 
employment “because of” her protected class status?60 
Moreover, these shortcuts appear to spawn and perpetuate an alluring sense 
of security in judges.  The narratives that underlie the shortcuts, like, for 
example, the assumption that a comment removed by a certain number of 
weeks or months from an action cannot belie a motive for that action, supply a 
false sense of security that embeds itself in the jurisprudence of a jurisdiction.61  
 
 55. See id. (“[T]he courts have created various loopholes that allow organizations to remain 
relatively autonomous, freely adhere to their particular business goals, and, far too often, escape 
liability for workplace discrimination.”); McGinley, supra note 1, at 206–07 (arguing that the 
liberal use of summary judgment in Title VII cases is inconsistent with the statutory scheme). 
 56. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Case law 
teaches that where the termination occurs within a relatively short time after the hiring there is a 
strong inference that discrimination was not a motivating factor in the employment decision.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 309 F. App’x 551, 559 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[S]tray 
remarks are rarely given great weight when made temporally remote from the decision to 
terminate [the plaintiff].”). 
 59. See, e.g., Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1993) (dismissing 
comments that are “too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a 
finding of . . . discrimination” (quoting Gagné v. Nw. Nat’l. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 
1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 60. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., Lucas v. PyraMax Bank, FSB, 539 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
comments by her boss that the plaintiff’s medical problems were a “kiss of death” were deemed 
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Judges who employ these shortcuts seem to rely on the fact that they are 
adhering to precedent developed within their jurisdictions and become 
complacent.62  These judges, by invoking these well-known doctrines and 
citing precedent that has done the same, appear to feel as though they have 
substantiated the outcome of their cases.  This is despite the fact that they are 
“shortcutting” around a fuller analysis.63 
A shortcut invoked at trial to instruct a jury as to permissible inferences 
and/or compelled conclusions often baselessly skews toward a defendant-
friendly result.  When judges invoke shortcuts in the course of deciding 
summary judgment motions, they may improperly substitute their view as to 
when an already questionable shortcut operates to foreclose a case as a matter 
of law, without resort to a trier of fact.  Moreover, even where a judge uses a 
shortcut to get to what may ultimately be a proper grant of summary judgment 
based on the whole of the evidence of record, that shortcut may obviate or 
curtail analysis necessary to the thorough, substantiated, and transparent 
reasoning that all litigants should expect on a dispositive motion.  As will be 
discussed, judges claim to remain bound and constrained by the cutoffs, 
inferences, and other shortcuts, which, ironically, free them up to clear their 
dockets without the sense that they have acted independently to cut off a claim.  
Courts seem to cling to this security, apparently insistent in believing that they 
are efficiently ridding their dockets of cases in which no reasonable trier could 
discern discrimination.  In this vein, courts divest themselves of the obligation 
to make difficult calls on questions of fact and law.64  Similarly, these shortcuts 
 
“stray remarks” because they were not made “contemporaneously or in connection with” the 
termination). 
 62. See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400–01 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (concluding that the comments could not defeat summary judgment “standing alone” 
because “these comments are best viewed under our Circuit precedent as stray remarks, thus not 
warranting survival of summary judgment”). 
 63. See McGinley, supra note 1, at 208 (noting the increased use of summary judgment in 
civil rights cases, although these types of cases most often turn on credibility and intent that only 
a fact finder should decide). 
 64. See McGinley, supra note 1, at 207 (“[L]ower courts have granted summary judgment in 
cases where there exist questions of fact concerning the employer’s motive, thereby denying to 
employment discrimination plaintiffs their ‘day in court’ historically promised by the American 
model of litigation.” (footnote omitted)); Ross B. Goldman, Note, Putting Pretext in Context: 
Employment Discrimination, the Same-Actor Inference, and the Proper Roles of Judges and 
Juries, 93 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1566 (2007) (“Because questions of fact are reserved for the finder 
of fact, and because juries are factfinders, courts usurp the juries’ authority when they find facts, 
assess the credibility of the evidence, and allow summary judgment for an employer—and this is 
precisely what happens in same-actor cases.”). 
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often alleviate responsibility for employers’ violations of Title VII, permitting 
employers to exploit them.65 
Three “shortcuts” will be discussed below: the same actor inference; the 
“stray comment” doctrine; and the temporal nexus requirement regarding the 
lapse of time between a comment or protected action and an adverse action. 
A. Same Actor Inference 
Pursuant to the so-called same-actor inference, first posited by the Fourth 
Circuit in 1991, when the same actor responsible for an adverse employment 
action either hired or promoted the employee at issue, there arises a “strong 
inference that the employer’s stated reason for acting against the employee is 
not pretextual,” and ultimately that discrimination did not underlie the adverse 
action.66  Though never sanctioned (or even mentioned) by the Supreme Court, 
the same actor inference, in some iteration, has won widespread acceptance 
throughout all of the federal jurisdictions in the United States, which vary in 
the strength they each accord it.67  The length of time that elapses between the 
 
 65. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 11, at 1122 (“[T]he same-actor principle exonerates 
employers from their responsibility to address structural and cultural barriers to workplace 
equality, forces within the employers’ control and which often they employ strategically for 
business reasons.”). 
 66. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit 
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1923 n.99 (2009) (“[T]he ‘same actor’ inference 
. . . permits a factfinder to conclude that the supervisor who hired the plaintiff did not later 
discriminate on the basis of a characteristic that would have been evident at the time of hiring.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing that the same actor inference has been recognized by almost every circuit and 
agreeing that in cases where an “‘employee was hired and fired by the same person within a 
relatively short time span,’ there is ‘a strong inference that the employer’s stated reason for acting 
against the employee is not pretextual’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 
796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991))); Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1442–43 (11th Cir. 
1998) (finding that where the same individual was responsible for hiring, promoting, and 
ultimately terminating plaintiff, that the “facts may give rise to a permissible inference that no 
discriminatory animus motivated [defendant’s] actions”); Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 
F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that it would be “difficult to impute . . . an invidious 
motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire”); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & 
Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270–71 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here the same actor is responsible for both the 
hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of 
time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.”); Buhrmaster v. Overnite 
Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the same actor inference “allows one to 
infer a lack of discrimination from the fact that the same individual both hired and fired the 
employee”).  Moreover, in a variation on this inference, in more than one jurisdiction, an 
inference of discrimination may be weakened where the plaintiff and the decision maker belong 
to the same protected class.  See, e.g., Coggins v. Gov’t of D.C., No. 97-2263, 1999 WL 94655, at 
*4 (4th Cir. Feb. 19, 1999); Gray v. Motorola, Inc., No. CV 07-1466-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 
3173987, at *14 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2009); Ziegler v. Del. Cnty. Daily Times, 128 F. Supp. 2d 
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hiring or promotion and the adverse action is, however, usually considered 
highly relevant to the strength and application of the inference by many 
jurisdictions,68 and time lapses of up to seven years have been held to properly 
invoke the inference.69 
Some circuits, like the Second Circuit, have been explicit about the fact 
that the inference is permissive, and courts in that circuit have noted that no 
court needs to “give [the defendant] the benefit of the inference at [the 
summary-judgment] stage of the litigation.”70  Nonetheless, the inference is 
alive and well in modern employment discrimination jurisprudence.71  Despite 
courts’ sporadic admonitions that the inference’s “use is not to become a 
substitute for a fact-intensive inquiry into the particular circumstances of the 
case at hand”72 and that “[t]he same-actor inference is not dispositive, 
 
790, 811 n.47 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Jackson v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, No. 99-CV-642, 2000 WL 
34292578, at *7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2000); DeWitt v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 73 F. Supp. 2d 589, 
598–99 (W.D.N.C. 1999).  This shows the extent of the assumptions at work when only a mere 
fact about the protected class membership or one-time act of a decision maker is known, as well 
as the power of these assumptions. 
 68. See, e.g., Jetter v. Knothe Corp., 324 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[The same actor] 
rationale is that when the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made 
the decision to hire, especially when the firing occurred only a short time after the hiring, it is 
difficult to impute to him an invidious firing motivation that would be inconsistent with his 
decision to hire.”); Grady, 130 F.3d at 560 (noting that the same actor inference is “especially” 
strong “when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring”); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 
795, 804 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The passage of time between those two events [of hiring and firing 
the plaintiff] is a relevant factor in weighing the [same actor] inference.”); Velez v. SES 
Operating Corp., No. 07 Civ. 10946(DLC), 2009 WL 3817461, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009); 
cf. Vancour v. Bozzuto’s Inc., No. 03CV2088 (JBA), 2006 WL 758636, at *7 n.5 (D. Conn. Mar. 
24, 2006) (finding that the same actor inference does not mandate summary judgment when many 
years had lapsed between positive employment decisions and termination). 
 69. Martin, supra note 11, at 1135; see, e.g., Herr v. Airborne Freight Corp., 130 F.3d 359, 
362–63 (8th Cir. 1997) (two-year interval); Hansen v. Clark Cnty., No. 2:05-CV-672-BES-VPC, 
2007 WL 1892127, at *2, 8 (D. Nev. June 27, 2007) (approximately seven-year interval); 
Hollingsworth v. Henry Cnty. Med. Ctr. EMS, Inc., No. 05-1272 B, 2007 WL 1695303, at *1, 5 
n.3 (W.D. Tenn. June 12, 2007) (six-year interval). 
 70. Collins v. Conn. Job Corps, 684 F. Supp. 2d 232, 251 (D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Memnon 
v. Cliford Chance US, LLP, 667 F. Supp. 2d 334, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Collins court further noted that “‘the inference alone is generally not a sufficient 
basis to grant summary judgment for the employer, at least when the employee has proffered 
evidence of pretext’ . . . or where there are ‘changes in circumstances during the course of [the 
plaintiff’s] employment.’”  Id. (quoting Masters v. F.W. Webb Co., No. 03-CV-6280L, 2008 WL 
4181724, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2008); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 155 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
 71. See, e.g., Dasgupta v. Harris, 407 F. App’x 325, 329 (10th Cir. 2011); Spears v. 
Patterson UTI Drilling Co., 337 F. App’x 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2009); Knadler v. Furth, 253 F. 
App’x 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 72. Collins, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 251 (quoting Copeland v. Rosen, 38 F. Supp. 2d 298, 305 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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however, when the decisionmaker makes comments demonstrating 
discriminatory animus,”73  other courts have held that where a short timeframe 
strengthens the inference, little short of “egregious facts,” will enable a 
plaintiff to overcome or rebut it.74  Noting that “in most cases involving [the 
same actor inference], [countervailing evidence of pretext] will not be 
forthcoming,” such courts have approached same actor decisions with 
overwhelming skepticism toward the plaintiff’s case from the outset.75 
The same actor inference, then, though rebuttable, is extremely difficult for 
a plaintiff to overcome as a practical matter.  In a noteworthy 2001 Fifth 
Circuit case, the plaintiff, attempting to surmount the application of the same 
actor inference, alleged that a decision maker “during a few staff meetings . . . 
admonished the attendees to listen carefully to [the plaintiff] because he did 
not speak English well.”76  Despite the fact that the court found that there was 
“no question that [the decision maker] had significant influence in the decision 
to discharge [the plaintiff]” and that it was “likely that remarks such as [those 
at issue] could, under other circumstances, provide support for a charge of 
discrimination based on national origin,” it held that the remarks constituted 
insufficient evidence of a factual issue as to pretext.77  In fact, the court held, in 
light of the plaintiff’s dearth of other evidence to rebut the legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the decision maker, the “remarks at 
most create a weak factual issue” because “[s]tanding alone, [the] remarks 
cannot defeat the inference created by the fact that [the plaintiff] was 
discharged by . . . the same individual who hired him — i.e., the inference that 
the discharge was not motivated by discrimination.”78 
In another recent case, the district court concluded that the plaintiff had 
failed to meet even the “minimal burden applicable at the prima facie stage” 
with respect to her production of evidence, declaring in no uncertain terms that 
the plaintiff had “identified no evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that 
would permit a reasonable fact-finder to draw an inference that plaintiff’s 
 
 73. Smith v. Tuckahoe Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 03 Civ. 7951(PGG), 2009 WL 3170302, 
at*8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 74. See, e.g., Penalver v. Res. Corp. of Am., No. 3:10-CV-0280-D, 2011 WL 1885988, at *5 
(N.D. Tex. May 18, 2011) (“[T]he question is whether [the plaintiff] has proffered evidence of 
sufficiently egregious facts to overcome the same actor inference and enable a reasonable jury to 
find that RCA’s articulated reasons for discharging her are pretextual.”); Watkins v. Johnson, No. 
3:10-cv-00025, 2010 WL 5479169, at *5 (W.D. La. Dec. 30, 2010) (“As in Brown, the evidence, 
construed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], is not sufficiently egregious to overcome 
the same-actor inference.” (citing Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 75. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 76. Cartagena v. Aegis Mortg. Corp., No. 01-20324, 2001 WL 1268730, at *6 (5th Cir. Oct. 
16, 2001). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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discharge was the result of unlawful discrimination against her because of her 
race or ethnicity.”79  This conclusion came despite the fact that the plaintiff set 
forth four occasions on which she alleged that workplace administrators 
utilized “racially insensitive language.”80  This language included the epithets 
“spics” and “dumb Puerto Rican” (referring to the plaintiff), as well as a 
reference to “you people” by an administrator while speaking to the plaintiff.81  
The court found that this inflammatory evidence could not properly be placed 
before a jury for evaluation due to the strength of the same actor inference: 
[P]laintiff’s allegations that Thadal called plaintiff a “dumb Puerto Rican,” that 
Thadal said the word “spics” during a telephone call with an unknown party, 
and that Thadal referred to “you people” while speaking to plaintiff, are 
effectively negated by the fact that Thadal herself was responsible . . . for the 
decision to hire plaintiff fewer than three months earlier.82 
By contrast, other courts have held that “the strength of that inference is 
for the jury to determine, not the court.”83  The rationale or narrative 
underlying the same actor inference is that “it hardly makes sense to hire 
workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of 
associating with them) only to fire them once they are on the job.”84  Simply 
put, “it is suspect to claim that the same manager who hired a person in the 
protected class would suddenly develop an aversion to members of that 
class.”85 
This rationale, and the inference itself, however, have come under heavy 
criticism. According to Professor Natasha Martin: 
The same-actor doctrine is based on several faulty assumptions.  First, it 
presumes that discrimination emanates only from a single bad actor, a biased 
individual who harbors negative feelings about another.  Second, it assumes 
that voluntary association with one who is different in the context of work 
means the decision-maker harbors no such negative feelings, or if he did, he 
 
 79. Velez v. SES Operating Corp., No. 07 Civ. 10946(DLC), 2009 WL 3817461, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 80. Id. at *10. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Bernstein v. Sephora, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also Williams v. 
Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is the province of the jury rather 
than the court . . . to determine whether the inference generated by ‘same actor’ evidence is strong 
enough to outweigh a plaintiff’s evidence of pretext.”). 
 84. Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 261 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Proud v. 
Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Speed v. 
Adidas Am., Inc., No. 04-CV-1430-PK, 2006 WL 897978, at *7 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2006) (“It is 
illogical to assume that Mr. Hewitt, who advocated on Speed’s behalf for years, would suddenly 
turn against him and fire him based on race.”). 
 85. Watt v. N.Y. Botanical Garden, No. 98 Civ. 1095(BSJ), 2000 WL 193626, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000). 
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has now resolved them and they are incapable of resurrection.  This greatly 
oversimplifies how bias operates and ignores the prevalence of grouping and 
collective processing in organizations, vectors that create the conditions for 
bias to flourish.86 
Scholarship and social science research reveal that the bias one harbors 
may not necessarily impede one’s hiring of an individual, for one reason or 
another (the bias is subconscious or unconscious); the bias may be concealed 
until the hired individual commences work, etc., but may emerge thereafter.87  
Indeed, scholars have taken note of the irony and unjustness of employers 
being able to claim credit for hiring members of minority groups, only to 
subsequently discriminate against them and elude liability due to the 
application of the same actor inference.88 
Scholars have long pointed to the incongruities between the contemporary 
American workplace and the narrative and logic that underlie the application of 
the same actor inference.89  Despite the fact that scholars have exhorted courts 
to forego the summary dismissal of cases based on the crude, unfounded, and 
simplistic assumptions embedded in the same actor inference’s narrative, and 
engage in thoughtful, searching decision-making,90 it does not appear that the 
 
 86. Martin, supra note 11, at 1122. 
 87. See id. (“[B]ias may not rear its ugly head until after an employee is immersed in a work 
setting or work group.”); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup 
Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1314–16 (1998) (discussing how the 
same actor inference is inconsistent with the way in which the mind really works). 
 88. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 11, at 1122 (“By ‘hiring brown’ in the first instance, for 
example, a racist employer is shielded against allegations of racism or somehow incapable of 
racist tendencies altogether in the eyes of the courts.  In this way, the same-actor doctrine 
operates as a subsidy for those employers that make the effort to diversify their workforces, 
cheapening notions of acceptability and workplace inclusiveness.”). 
 89. See Krieger, supra note 87, at 1314 (stating that “there is substantial reason to believe 
that [the same actor doctrine’s] . . . underlying assumptions are wrong, that this is simply not how 
discrimination works, at least not discrimination deriving from implicit stereotypes about the 
aptitudes and abilities associated with different demographic groups”); Martin, supra note 11, at 
1139 (arguing that new and evolving “work structure, evaluative models, and relational 
dynamics” in the contemporary workplace “serve as vectors for the injection of bias into the 
decision-making process between the time an individual is hired and fired, or otherwise subjected 
to adverse treatment”). 
 90. Goldman, supra note 64, at 1560 (“[C]ourts that dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on account of 
the same-actor inference act in a way contrary to the implicit mandate of the Supreme Court that 
such broadly applicable per se rules are misplaced in employment discrimination litigation.”); 
Martin, supra note 11, at 1170 (“[C]ourts should engage the shifting and complex nature of any 
particular work setting instead of proclaiming the existence of same-actor evidence determinative 
of, or even pertinent to, the ultimate question of discrimination, and thereby summarily 
dismissing plaintiff’s claims.”). 
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inference is going anywhere.  If anything, it has become more entrenched in 
employment discrimination jurisprudence recently.91 
B. “Stray Comments” 
Another so-called shortcut that courts have used to foreclose a plaintiff’s 
case at the summary judgment stage is the stray comment or stray remark 
doctrine, which also is not a uniform, coherent, and consistent doctrine from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.92  This doctrine is invoked at various stages of a 
case, but often when a plaintiff proffers as evidence of discrimination one or 
more discriminatory comments, and the court arrives at the conclusion that the 
comments are, as a matter of law, “stray,” and thus either wholly not relevant 
or insufficient, without more (or sometimes with more), to propel the 
plaintiff’s case forward.93  Moreover, courts may allude to comments as 
“stray” when, in fact, the courts may be summarily dismissing them as not 
relevant to the adjudication at hand for any number of reasons.94  Thus, a court 
may use the word stray to mean that a comment is wholly not relevant,95 but 
another court may use the word to mean that while the comment may have 
relevance, it will not be sufficient evidence of the discrimination alleged to, as 
a matter of law, warrant going before a trier of fact.96 
 
 91. See Martin, supra note 12, at 358 (“Since the formulation of the same-actor principle in 
1991, its evolution has been steady and expansive.  The principle has received affirmation from 
most of the courts addressing the issue, with most endorsing the Proud court’s rationale with, if 
not resounding approval, at least passive acceptance.”). 
 92. For a more expansive discussion of the evolution of the stray remark doctrine and a 
critique of its promulgation and application, see generally Stone, supra note 11. 
 93. See, e.g., Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“[S]tray remarks that are neither proximate nor related to the employment decision are 
insufficient to defeat summary judgment.” (quoting Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 
799, 813 (7th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane 
Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400–401 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 347 
(“What accounts for this unfavorable treatment of expressions of bias is what is commonly 
known as the ‘stray remarks doctrine.’  Under this construct, courts reviewing statements of bias 
often describe them as ‘stray remarks.’  While admissible, they are often insufficient to raise a 
triable issue of fact.” (footnote omitted)). 
 94. See generally Stone, supra note 11. 
 95. See, e.g., Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 F. App’x 275, 280 (6th Cir. 
2004) (“[I]solated and ambiguous comments are too . . . irrelevant and prejudicial[] to support a 
finding of . . . discrimination.” (quoting Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 760 (6th 
Cir. 2000). 
 96. See, e.g., Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 368 (3d Cir. 2008) (“As the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has opined, ‘although . . . stray remarks, standing alone, 
may not give rise to an inference of discrimination, such remarks are not irrelevant.’” (quoting 
Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 2000))); Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 2001) (“As we have acknowledged, in combination with other 
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Courts seeking to decide whether a comment may provide a basis upon 
which to infer that discriminatory animus motivated an adverse employment 
decision have traditionally looked to the following factors: 
(1) whether the remarks were made by the decision maker or by an agent of the 
employer uninvolved in the challenged decision; (2) whether the remarks were 
isolated or part of a pattern of biased comments; (3) whether the remarks were 
made close in time or remote from the challenged decision; and (4) whether 
the remarks were ambiguous or are clearly reflective of discriminatory bias.97 
In fact, several jurisdictions have held that a discriminatory comment made by 
a decision maker must be deemed a stray comment unless it 1) directly 
addresses the plaintiff’s protected class; 2) is temporally connected to the 
adverse employment action at issue; 3) is made by a person with authority over 
the employment decision at issue; and 4) relates directly to the precise adverse 
action at issue.98  Other jurisdictions will seize upon one facet of a comment, 
such as the fact that it was uttered by a non-decision maker,99 too far in time 
 
evidence[,] so-called stray remarks may permit a jury reasonably to determine that an employer 
was motivated by a discriminatory intent.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Walden v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Because it is clear, however, that 
stray remarks by non-decisionmakers may be relevant to the question whether the plaintiffs were 
fired in retaliation for protected activity, these facts in and of themselves are not sufficient to 
deem the Woodham and Fuller statements irrelevant.”); Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 892 F.2d 
1434, 1438–39 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that stray remarks will not create a triable issue); see also 
Stone, supra note 11 (manuscript at 8–15) (describing examples of courts’ application of the stray 
comment doctrine). 
 97. Sanders v. Kettering Univ., No. 07-11905, 2009 WL 3010849, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 
17, 2009) (referring to factors involved in state actions brought under the Elliott-Larsen Civil 
Rights Act), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 411 F. App’x 771 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing only judgment with respect to the breach of contract claim); accord Medina v. Ramsey 
Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 683 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Remarks may serve as sufficient evidence of age 
discrimination if they are: 1) age related, 2) proximate in time to the employment decision, 3) 
made by an individual with authority over the employment decision at issue, and 4) related to the 
employment decision at issue.”). 
 98. Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2010); Brown v. Dir. 
SCDC, No. 8:08-3761-HFF-BHH, 2010 WL 3167332, at *8 (D.S.C. May 28, 2010) (citing Patel 
v. Midland Mem’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 298 F.3d 333, 344 (5th Cir. 2002)); Delgado Graulau v. 
Pegasus Commc’ns of P.R., 130 F. Supp. 2d 320, 330 (D.P.R. 2001). 
 99. See, e.g., Mieczkowski v. York City Sch. Dist., 414 F. App’x 441, 448 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“There is nothing in the record to suggest that either the board member who told Penn to go 
‘after whites’ or Penn had any involvement in the decision to reprimand Mieczkowski . . . .  
Accordingly, we find that the District Court correctly concluded that . . . Mieczkowski failed to 
show that [the decision maker] treated Mieczkowski less favorably than other employees based 
on her race.”); Bennett v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We add, 
moreover, that even if the grievances did not comprise hearsay, they would not have had a 
decisive bearing on the issues before the district court.  After all, [the commenter] was not the 
decisionmaker here.”). 
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from the adverse action,100 about an individual other than the plaintiff,101 or 
even about the plaintiff, but in a context apart from the adverse action,102 in 
order to deem the comment “stray.” 
This doctrine has been criticized for permitting judges and juries alike to 
bypass a reasoned analysis of the totality of the circumstances of a case, in 
favor of a rotely applied label, “stray,” that often serves, without justification, 
to divest the evidence of its probative value.103  Moreover, scholarship has 
criticized the individual considerations that can lead a court to relegate a 
 
 100. See, e.g., Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the decision maker’s comment that the employee looked tired and old, made more 
than a year before the adverse action at issue, was insufficient to prove discrimination); Read v. 
BT Alex Brown Inc., 72 F. App’x 112, 120 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The comment, however, was made 
at the beginning of Read’s tenure with Brown, and almost three years prior to her termination.  As 
the district court concluded, therefore, this comment cannot be viewed as proximate in time to the 
challenged employment decision, and cannot therefore be considered as meaningfully probative 
evidence that Read’s termination was discriminatory.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that the manager’s “acting like a man” comment made to another female employee more than one 
year before the adverse action in question was insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent); 
Brauninger v. Motes, 260 F. App’x 634, 640 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Brauninger offers the fact that 
Roniger, who was one year older than Brauninger, had referred jokingly to himself, Brauninger, 
and another employee as ‘grey-haired men.’  Such stray remark, however, is not unambiguous 
evidence of animus, given that Roniger was referring to himself as well as to Brauninger.”); Cox 
v. Infomax Office Sys., Inc., No. 4:07-cv-0457-JAJ, 2009 WL 124700, at *8 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 16, 
2009) (“Here, all Cox has shown is that Jacobs’ [sic] made a stray remark about another 
employee.  Having already discounted much of Cox’s other evidence, this evidence also does not 
raise an inference of age discrimination.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Fjelsta v. Zogg Dermatology, PLC, 488 F.3d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 2007) (“As 
there is no other evidence linking this comment to the job performance actions taken more than 
one month later, we agree with the district court that Deanne Zogg’s comment, in context, was a 
‘stray remark in the workplace.’”); Shahriary v. Teledesic LLC, 60 F. App’x 157, 161 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“Although the statements relied upon by Shahriary in support of his national origin claim . 
. . might suggest ethnic bias, Shahriary has produced no evidence showing a causal connection 
between those statements and his termination.  Without such a connection, the statements can 
only be interpreted as stray remarks . . . .”); Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36–37 
(1st Cir. 2001) (“Straughn proffered no evidence that Giglio ever used the nondescript ‘southern 
black’ accent either during or in relation to the challenged employment action. . . . Thus, 
Straughn’s naked ipse dixit was insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 11, at 791 (“However, even in the indirect liability context, 
the stray remarks doctrine may be too expansive, causing courts to limit the types of evidence that 
plaintiffs can marshal on behalf of their claims of individual discrimination.”); Stone, supra note 
11 (manuscript at 3) (“[T]he stray comments ‘doctrine’ does more harm than good and . . . courts 
wishing to grant a defendant summary judgment on a claim should have to do so by looking at the 
totality of circumstances, rather than summarily using a single facet of a comment to dismiss it 
from consideration.”). 
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comment to “stray” status as being unfounded.104  So, for example, the fact that 
a racist comment was made about an individual by a decision maker is likely 
probative of the speaker’s mindset, even if it was made outside of the precise 
timeframe or context of the adverse employment action at issue.105  Similarly, 
it ought to be possible to find probative value in a discriminatory comment 
made by one other than the decision maker, especially if the comment is 
indicative of the workplace culture, ethos, or atmosphere.106  Further, courts 
that deem a comment “stray” simply because it is somewhat ambiguous may 
be improperly removing a valid judgment as to the plausibility of a certain 
interpretation from a trier of fact by deeming the comment benign as a matter 
of law.107 
C. Temporal Nexus Requirement 
There are two primary ways in which courts may invoke what they call a 
temporal nexus/proximity requirement to sometimes automatically, and 
sometimes artificially, cut off a plaintiff’s case.  In the first of these two 
scenarios, a plaintiff who is alleging discrimination of some kind is fortunate 
 
 104. See, e.g., Sperino, supra note 11, at 791 (“The stray remarks doctrine also poses a 
problem within the employment discrimination field, and this problem is one that shares some 
connection with the focus on the rogue actor and a simplified view of workplace 
decisionmaking.”); Stone, supra note 11 (manuscript at 26) (“[W]here social science is permitted 
to inform an analysis of the underlying premises of the stray comment doctrine and the factors 
that could cause a judge to ascribe the dooming moniker ‘stray’ to evidence, it becomes clear that 
these premises are flawed and fail to comport with the way in which people really interact, react, 
and form and impressions or biases.”). 
 105. See Sperino, supra note 11, at 791 (“Further, especially with subjective assessments that 
could be made over time, a comment that was made several years away from the final decision 
may demonstrate that the decisionmaker had biased viewpoints that led either directly or 
indirectly to faulty or even false assessments of the employee’s performance.”); Stone, supra note 
11 (manuscript at 29) (“This is despite the fact that there is often every reason to believe that one 
who voices a discriminatory belief very likely adheres to that belief in other contexts.”). 
 106. See Sperino, supra note 11, at 791 (“Remarks being made by coworkers and others 
within the workplace may influence the decision ultimately made, as a decisionmaker may either 
explicitly or implicitly take these remarks into consideration when making an employment 
decision.”). 
 107. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.  In the specific instance in which an alleged 
discriminatory comment is deemed to be too removed in time from the adverse action at issue, 
some courts refer to the comment as a “stray comment,” and others talk about a “temporal nexus 
requirement” that was not met so as to permit the case to proceed.  For the sake of clarity, 
examples of such cases will be addressed in the discussion below, Part II.C, which is devoted to 
so-called “temporal nexus requirements.”  Such requirements are found in both cases alleging 
disparate treatment in which proffered comments are deemed to be too removed in time from the 
adverse action at hand and retaliation cases, in which courts find as a matter of law that a claim 
may not be maintained because too much time has elapsed between the plaintiff’s protected 
activity and the adverse action that later befalls the plaintiff. 
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enough to have evidence that a decision maker made what might be interpreted 
as a comment evincing animus or some kind of bias against the protected class 
to which the plaintiff belongs.  This is significant, as will be discussed, because 
bias in the workplace tends, due to cultural, social, and even legal pressures, to 
be repressed and unexpressed explicitly.108  However, due to the presence of an 
arbitrarily-chosen cutoff with respect to how much time may elapse between 
such a comment and an adverse employment action in the given jurisdiction, 
the judge declines to attach significance to the comment, adverting to either a 
failed “temporal nexus requirement” or to a resultant “stray comment.”109 
1. Comments 
Most courts agree that an employment discrimination plaintiff may make 
out her case by either using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework110 discussed previously or by using direct evidence of 
discrimination.111  Although the Supreme Court has not articulated a definition 
 
 108. See Bartlett, supra note 66, at 1895–96 & nn.2–3 (2009) (discussing how social 
psychology research has revealed that racial and gender bias is “invisible, deep and pervasive,” 
and asserting that such bias, though increasingly implicit or unconscious, still exists and causes 
discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 
(1995) (stating that “subtle, often unconscious forms of bias” are more common in the modern 
workplace than “the deliberate discrimination prevalent in an earlier age”); Dale Larson, 
Antidiscrimination Law in the Workplace: Moving Beyond the Impasse, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, 
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 303, 306 (2009) (stating that despite the realization that “modern 
workplaces often rely heavily on informal interactions and subjective measures of performance, 
thereby increasing opportunities for subtle discrimination to take place . . . the law continues to 
assume that discrimination is only the result of individual, explicit animus reflected clearly in the 
evidence of the discriminatory act”); Ishra Solieman, Note, Born Osama: Muslim-American 
Employment Discrimination, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1082–83 (2009) (“Research in cognitive 
psychology has also shown that modern discrimination in the workplace is more subtle and 
complex than traditional modes of employment discrimination.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Wittenburg v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 831, 837 (8th Cir. 
2006) (finding that the statement did not establish that age was a factor for the employee’s 
termination over a year later); Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that a comment made more than two years from the adverse employment action was too 
far removed to constitute evidence of discriminatory motive); Wohler v. Toledo Stamping  & 
Mfg. Co., No. 96-4187, 1997 WL 603422, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1997) (“This court has in the 
past concluded that a comment made even a year before discharge is too far removed in time to 
be indicative of discriminatory intent behind the termination decision.”).  But see Johnson v. 
Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 868 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that despite the two-year gap between the 
discriminatory statements and the adverse action, “Newman’s statement must . . . be viewed in 
connection with the evidence concerning racial jokes and slurs prior to Johnson’s arrival at the 
Wheelersburg store”). 
 110. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 111. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that 
in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff can defeat summary judgment by establishing an 
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of “direct evidence,” it has been defined as “evidence which reflects a 
discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or 
retaliation complained of by the employee. . . . [and] indicate[s] that the 
complained-of employment decision was motivated by the decision-maker’s 
[racial animus].”112  However, “[t]o qualify as direct evidence of 
discrimination, [courts] require that a biased statement by a decision-maker be 
made concurrently with the adverse employment event, such that no inference 
is necessary to conclude that the bias necessarily motivated the decision.”113  
Thus, biased statements that do not meet these criteria are cast into the realm of 
evidence that may, at best, help establish a plaintiff’s case that her employer’s 
alleged legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action is pretextual and 
masking discrimination.114 
In any event, however, courts adjudicating claims of employment 
discrimination brought under federal statutes have routinely excluded evidence 
at trial or refused to accord evidence of biased comments enough weight to 
stave off a grant of summary judgment for the employer, without any thought 
 
inference of discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis); Luciano v. 
Monfort, Inc., 259 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Without any evidence . . . that [the comment-
maker] was a decisionmaker . . . his statements are insufficient to form the basis for a direct 
evidence analysis.  Therefore, the district court properly applied McDonnell Douglas rather than a 
direct evidence analysis.”). 
 112. Williamson v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 372 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam) (quoting Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358–
59 (11th Cir. 1999)); accord King v. Hardesty, 517 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8th Cir. 2008) (“We have 
held that direct evidence . . . include[s] ‘evidence of actions or remarks of the employer that 
reflect a discriminatory attitude,’ ‘comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the 
decisional process,’ or comments ‘uttered by individuals closely involved in employment 
decisions.’” (quoting Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991))); Jones v. 
Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 993 (5th Cir. 2005) (“When a person or persons with 
decision making authority evinces racial animus that may constitute direct evidence of 
discrimination.”); Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Direct 
evidence ‘can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the defendant or 
its agents.’  Direct evidence is a ‘distinct’ type of evidence that uniquely reveals ‘intent to 
discriminate[, which] is a mental state.’” (quoting Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 736 
(7th Cir. 1994))); Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 
(6th Cir. 1999) (“In discrimination cases, direct evidence is that evidence which, if believed, 
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the 
employer’s actions.”). 
 113. Williamson, 372 F. App’x at 940. 
 114. See, e.g., Indurante v. Local 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 367 (7th Cir. 
1998) (‘“[S]tray remarks’—biased comments ‘made by the decisionmaker but not related to the 
disputed employment action.’ . . . ‘may be relevant to the question of pretext . . . even though they 
do not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent.’” (quoting O’Connor v. DePaul Univ., 
123 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 1997))); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 347 (“Even where a 
plaintiff’s evidence fails to establish direct evidence of discrimination, it may serve as 
circumstantial proof that the employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination.”). 
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as to what probative value or insight they might have provided, simply because 
an arbitrary time limit had been exceeded.115 Although there is no guidance in 
the statute itself as to how to assess such evidence or when a court should 
declare what might otherwise be a “smoking gun” revealing the prejudices or 
biases of a decision maker valueless, courts have nonetheless taken it upon 
themselves to impose such cutoffs—permissible periods of time that may 
elapse between the utterance of a biased comment and an adverse action before 
the evidence may no longer be considered.116 
Such cutoffs, especially when used at the summary judgment stage to 
foreclose a case without an ample look at all of the evidence, are dangerous 
and may subvert employment discrimination statutes’ abilities to serve as 
instruments in furtherance of their stated goals.117  Discrimination simply 
cannot be properly ferreted out and victims vindicated when much of the scant 
extant evidence of that which biased decision makers try so hard to hide—their 
true feelings of bias—is dismissed as wholly not relevant and beyond the 
bounds of consideration.  While the passage of time or the changing of 
contexts may attenuate the strength of evidence, removing the evidence from 
consideration denies a trier of fact the opportunity to assess the totality of 
circumstances surrounding an allegation of workplace discrimination.  This is 
particularly so where (1) such comments may very well be indicative of the 
speaker’s feelings generally or in other contexts and (2) social, legal, and other 
pressures conspire to compel the repression of such sentiments, such that their 
 
 115. See, e.g., Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(finding a comment made “nearly a year” before the adverse employment action was too remote 
to be indicative of discriminatory intent); Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655–56 (5th 
Cir.1996) (finding a sixteen-month old comment to be too “vague, indirect, and remote in time” 
to propel the case past summary judgment); see also Stone, supra note 11 (manuscript at 12) 
(“Due to the presence of an arbitrarily chosen cutoff time with respect to how much time may 
elapse between a comment alleged to evince bias and an adverse employment action in the given 
jurisdiction, judges often decline to attach significance to the comment.”). 
 116. The temporal proximity of a comment to an adverse action, even if established, will not 
necessarily be dispositive on the issue of whether a material fact adequate to ensure the plaintiff’s 
case’s survival is created.  See, e.g., Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009 
WL 35237, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (“Mr. Berrier and Ms. Carlson fired Ms. Creed on the 
spot after she informed them that she couldn’t conform her appearance to the male standard.  
Mere temporal proximity alone, however, is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact.  As a result, Ms. Creed must rely on evidence in addition to the timing of her termination in 
order to proceed under the direct method of proof.” (citations omitted)); see also Tubergen v. St. 
Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 517 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Overall, the record 
reflects that Tubergen cannot employ the direct method to make a case for age discrimination.  
The ‘old guard’ comment[, which was made shortly after Tubergen’s termination,] was made in 
reference to a completely different group of individuals—those working in the children’s 
hospital—and was likely to refer to structure, as opposed to the age of the employees being 
eliminated.”). 
 117. See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
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expression and their being “captured” as evidence through testimony, is quite 
rare.  While on a case-by-case basis, it should be, of course, permissible for a 
court or juror to find that (as a matter of law or otherwise) a plaintiff’s case 
fails, it is incredibly one-dimensional to presume that there is a concrete, fixed 
point after which there is no room for consideration of the possibility that a 
speaker evinced his or her true feelings or tendencies with a biased comment 
and thereupon belied his or her public or professional persona. 
On one hand, it may be the case that a court finds that a plaintiff lacks a 
legal basis to proceed past the summary judgment stage where her evidence of 
a biased comment is sufficiently attenuated because of a deficiency in timing 
or context, and the defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for doing 
what it did is unassailable and/or undisputed.118  At a certain point, a court 
ought to be able to say that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff’s case lacks merit.  
On the other hand, however, where a mixed motive is alleged, there may be 
room to find that dual motives were underlying the decisions made, and in 
such a case, where the evidence of a biased comment might prove illustrative 
or useful, its use should not be foreclosed simply and only because some rigid, 
arbitrary criterion has not been met. 
2. Retaliation 
A court may foreclose a plaintiff’s retaliation case under Title VII or some 
other remedial statute that prohibits workplace discrimination where it 
determines that the protected activity for which the plaintiff alleges he was 
retaliated is too far removed in time from the adverse action that the plaintiff 
alleges constitutes the retaliatory act.119  To make out a case of retaliation 
under Title VII, most employment discrimination statutes, and the common 
law generally, a plaintiff must show: that she engaged in protected activity 
(defined explicitly by the statute in which an anti-retaliation provision might be 
embedded or determined by courts to be the type of activity that the law seeks 
 
 118. See, e.g., Torres v. Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de P.R., 260 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372–
73 (D.P.R. 2003) (holding that the employer’s proffered reason for terminating the employee was 
not pretext for discrimination where the supervisor’s comments lacked the temporal relationship 
and specificity that would connect them to the employee’s termination). 
 119. See, e.g., McCray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 377 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Although McCray claims to have complained of racial discrimination in 1997 and 2001, such 
complaints are too far removed from McCray’s termination to satisfy causation . . . .”); Pham v. 
City of Seattle, 7 F. App’x 575, 577 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The alleged retaliation occurred a decade 
after Pham engaged in the protected activity—too temporally removed to establish a prima facie 
case of retaliatory motive.”); Szabo v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., No 98-1410, 1998 WL 1085688, at *4 
(1st Cir. Dec. 31, 1998) (“The alleged refusal to sign the application is temporally too far 
removed from Szabo’s complaints about Labadie for a rational jury to find a causal link between 
the protected activity (complaining about Labadie) and the adverse personnel action (refusal to 
sign the application) . . . .”). 
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to safeguard), that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is 
a tenable causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
action.120 
In 2001, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he cases that accept mere 
temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity 
and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to 
establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must 
be ‘very close,’”121 and pointed to two court of appeals cases in which a four-
month time gap and a three-month time gap were each held to be insufficient 
to sustain an inference of retaliation.122  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has, for its part, held that absent direct evidence of retaliation, a three-month 
nexus will suffice to demonstrate an inference of causal connection,123 but 
noted that a four-month nexus will not.124  The Ninth Circuit, evaluating a 
retaliation claim under ERISA, noted that “‘[w]hile the timing of a discharge 
 
 120. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision states that “[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 
this subchapter.”); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (ADA’s anti-retaliation provision states that “[n]o 
person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 
practice made unlawful by this chapter.”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4(d), 29 
U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision states “[i]t shall be unlawful for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because such individual . . . has 
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
litigation under this chapter.”); see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 
Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850–51 (2009) (stating that employees who raise concerns about 
discrimination or harassment in an internal investigation are protected from retaliation under Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation clause); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (finding that a 
federal employee who is a victim of retaliation due to the filing of a complaint of age 
discrimination may assert a claim under the federal-sector provision of the ADEA); Burlington N. 
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (holding that Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision prohibits not just adverse employment-related actions, but any action that might 
“dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”); Hanig v. 
Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist., 384 F. Supp. 2d 710, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that the filing of a 
complaint with EEOC is a protected activity for purposes of establishing participation in 
protected activity as a element of retaliation claim under ADA). 
 121. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam) (quoting 
O’Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 122. Id. (citing Richmond v. ONEOK, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (10th Cir. 1997)) (three-month 
period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1992) (four-month 
period insufficient). 
 123. Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 124. Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Conner v. Schnuck Markets, 
Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
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may in certain situations create the inference of reprisal [under ERISA],” such 
an inference must be reasonable when evaluating the evidence.125 
“Accordingly,” a district court in the First Circuit has observed, “even very 
close temporal proximity is not always sufficient to carry a plaintiff’s prima 
facie case.”126  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “in order to 
support an inference of retaliatory motive, the termination must have occurred 
‘fairly soon after the employee’s protected expression,’”127 and a district court 
noted that “‘[f]airly soon’ is limited to days, not weeks or months.”128 
As with other types of employment discrimination, the complex, nuanced 
dynamics that go into how the impetus to retaliate forms and how and when it 
is acted upon is incredibly difficult to capture or pin down.  The notion that 
one who seeks to exact revenge on another or to otherwise deter another from 
engaging in an activity will only act relatively quickly following the activity is 
overly simplistic.129  There are, in fact, numerous reasons as to why a longer 
period than the number of days, weeks, or months allotted by a particular 
jurisdiction may elapse before someone retaliates against another.  Someone 
may wish to wait for the ideal opportunity to exact retribution on another, and 
that opportunity may not arise for a period of time.  Thus, a decision maker 
may wait for business to be slow and ensure that all of those whom she 
considers to be “troublemakers” are laid off.  Such an act may also reflect ones 
deliberately waiting before retaliating against another precisely so she can take 
revenge against someone and not have it appear to be retaliation.  Indeed, 
someone who is schooled in the relevant law of a given jurisdiction may wait 
 
 125. Kimbro v. Atl. Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 126. Vázquez Segarra v. P.R. Tel. Co., 2008 WL 1745869, at *5 (D.P.R. 2008). 
 127. Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1009–10 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 511 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
 128. Chapman v. Essex Grp., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-84 TS, 2007 WL 1891813, at *11 (N.D. Ind. 
June 29, 2007); accord Timm v. Wright State Univ., 375 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Eight 
months is a long period of time for an employer to wait to retaliate against an employee with a 
termination notice . . . .”); Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that a “three and one-half month temporal proximity [between a protected activity and an 
adverse employment action] is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation”); Hafford v. 
Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff could not demonstrate a 
temporal nexus between filing OCRC and EEOC complaints and disciplinary actions which 
occurred two to five months afterwards); Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 
(10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] three-month period, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation.”); 
Cooper v. City of N. Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the employer’s 
discharge of the plaintiff four months after the plaintiff filed a discrimination claim is insufficient 
to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge). 
 129. See, e.g., Justin P. O’Brien, Note, Weighing Temporal Proximity in Title VII Retaliation 
Claim, 43 B.C. L. REV. 741, 768–69 (2002) (citing Charles A. Shanor, Preventing and Defending 
Against Retaliation Claims, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: ADVANCED EMP. L. & LITIG. 547, 
586–91 (Dec. 2, 1999)). 
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precisely so that as a matter of law, the retaliation can no longer be established.  
Human beings’ desires to retaliate or to exact retribution do not necessarily 
dissipate with the passage of mere weeks or months,130 but rather, may actually 
intensify over time. 
Absent other compelling evidence of retaliation, the more time that elapses 
before retaliation occurs, the more attenuated the idea that the act at issue 
really was motivated by retaliation becomes.131  Notwithstanding, a rote, 
mechanistic cutoff stipulated by a given jurisdiction does nothing to promote 
justice where it automatically forecloses a court’s consideration of the 
allegations in their totality, including, for example, the substance of the 
comment.  Ultimately, it merely serves to educate one who might retaliate as to 
precisely how he may do so most effectively.  Moreover, variations in the 
threshold in different jurisdictions just render the limits more arbitrary.  Some 
courts, for example, have held that it is only appropriate to require a small lag 
in time between a protected activity and an adverse action “where the plaintiff 
is relying exclusively on a temporal nexus to establish the causation element of 
a prima facie case.”132 
At the very least, courts should not identify a set timeframe beyond which 
they will refuse to recognize, as a matter of law, that retaliation has 
occurred.133  Rather, even if a court decides that in the absence of direct or 
other evidence, too much time has, in fact, elapsed to sustain the inference that 
retaliation occurred, it should nonetheless be compelled to engage in an 
analysis of the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s rationale 
for conferring the adverse action at issue upon the plaintiff.134 
 
 130. See id. 
 131. See, e.g., Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (per curiam) 
(noting that a great lapse in time can defeat an inference of causation); Dowe v. Total Action 
Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998) (“A lengthy time lapse 
between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse 
employment action . . . negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two.”). 
 132. Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 256–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 629 F.3d 
276 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  In Thomas, the court held that the plaintiff’s additional evidence 
made it such that “[t]he jury may well have determined, based on the evidence presented, that 
Baron and Agrawal were intent on seeing Thomas fired as of when he complained but that it was 
not until August of 2003 that a sufficient opportunity to play a significant role in Thomas’s 
termination, and thus effectuate their retaliatory intentions, presented itself.”  Id. at 257. 
 133. O’Brien, supra note 129, at 768–69. 
 134. See Coates v. Dalton, 927 F. Supp. 169, 170–71 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (determining, despite a 
four-year lag between the plaintiff’s protected activity and his adverse employment action, “as no 
evidence was presented at trial that an earlier opportunity for promotion existed, the jury could 
have inferred that plaintiff was denied a promotion on the very first possible occasion following 
his [protected] activity”); cf. Troy B. Daniels & Richard A. Bales, Plus at Pretext: Resolving the 
Split Regarding the Sufficiency of Temporal Proximity Evidence in Title VII Retaliation Cases, 44 
GONZ. L. REV. 493, 496–97, 514 (2008/09) (arguing that courts should require temporal 
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III.  WAYS IN WHICH TORT LAW AIDS PLAINTIFFS BY FURNISHING THEM WITH 
BENEFICIAL MEANS OF MAKING OUT THEIR CASES 
In contrast with the law of employment discrimination, tort law is replete 
with examples of presumptions, shortcuts, and inferences that fill evidentiary 
gaps for plaintiffs who, like employment discrimination plaintiffs, seek to 
vindicate their rights in court and procure recompense for their damages.  In 
some cases, like those of certain intentional torts, courts crafting jurisprudence 
over centuries have aided plaintiffs seeking to establish the presence of the 
requisite intent.135  In others, like negligence cases in which the plaintiff has to 
demonstrate that the requisite level of care was not taken by another, certain 
inferences help to establish that based upon the very nature of an activity 
alleged to confer the harm at issue, no amount of actual care taken suffices to 
deflect liability for actual harm conferred.136  In each case, courts adjudicating 
tort disputes seem to have taken a reasoned look at the relative inability of 
plaintiffs to procure certain bits of information to which only the defendant 
would be privy.  An example of this would be exactly how a barrel of flour 
might have fallen out of the window of a bakery137 or whether a defendant who 
kicked a plaintiff volitionally meant to harm him or merely to nudge him138—
as well as the assumed nature of humans and human perception—in a way that 
courts adjudicating employment discrimination disputes have stubbornly 
refused to do. 
The so-called “shortcuts” that judges in the area of employment 
discrimination employ stand in stark contrast with the reasoned methodologies 
that courts permit plaintiffs’ attorneys to employ in order to build a case 
involving an intent requirement against a defendant in other areas of law.  Title 
VII does not require specific intent to harm another person, malice, invidious 
or overt discrimination, or conscious animus of any kind.139  However, in tort 
 
proximity only at the prima facie stage, but then require “Temporal Proximity Plus at the pretext 
stage”). 
 135. See, e.g., Quilici v. Second Amendment Found., 769 F.2d 414, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(discussing statements considered libelous per se). 
 136. See, e.g., Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Exch.); Larkin v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 389, 391–92 (La. 1957); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wrap-
On Co., 626 So. 2d 874, 876–77 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 137. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301. 
 138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(a)–(b) (1965) (stating that mere intent to 
cause imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact when such contact results will lead 
to liability for battery); see also Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093–94 (Wash. 1955) (stating 
in a case involving an intentional tort, that a defendant need act only volitionally with knowledge 
that contact or apprehension will result, not with purpose to harm or offend another). 
 139. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under [Title VII], practices, 
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained 
if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”). 
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law, where these specific states of mind must sometimes be established, 
inferences and presumptions typically work to aid plaintiffs. 
It is common knowledge in the litigation of civil wrongs, or torts, that the 
requisite intent to be proven by a plaintiff complaining of an intentional tort 
may be proven via circumstantial evidence.140  Similarly, negligence, or the 
breach of the duty of care that society ascribes to an individual in a given 
situation, may also be established through circumstantial evidence.141 
Traditionally in tort law, the burden resides wholly with the plaintiff to prove 
that it is more likely than not that her harm was caused by the defendant’s 
negligence or intentional tort.142  Notwithstanding, however, numerous 
doctrines, inferences, and presumptions have been crafted by courts over 
centuries that seem to account for how ill-equipped a plaintiff might be to 
procure or furnish key evidence regarding a tortfeasor’s mental state or precise, 
undisclosed misstep that engendered the plaintiff’s harm.  Invoked in 
circumstances where it is relatively safe to accord the benefit of any doubt to 
the plaintiff—in other words, circumstances in which the plaintiff, through no 
fault of her own, clearly looks to be in the right for one reason or another—
these so-called “shortcuts” operate to assist plaintiffs and to permit their cases 
to get before a trier of fact. 
A. Res Ipsa Loquitur 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is Latin for “the thing speaks for 
itself,”143 is, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “merely one kind 
of case of circumstantial evidence.”144  Its origin, as per the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, was as a phrase “let fall” by attorney Baron Pollock in the 
course of arguing a case in 1863.145 
 
 140. Woods v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 98-3560, 1999 WL 685926, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 
1999) (“A plaintiff may establish his or her intentional workplace tort claim by presenting . . . 
circumstantial evidence of such intent.”); see also Eric P. Voigt, Driving Through the Dense Fog: 
Analysis of and Proposed Changes to Ohio Tortious Interference Law, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 
358 n.63 (2007) (“Circumstantial evidence is often used to establish the intent element of other 
intentional torts.”). 
 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. b (1965); see, e.g., Thomas v. Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[N]egligence may be proved by 
circumstantial evidence, provided that the circumstances are sufficient to take the case ‘out of the 
realm of conjecture and place it within the field of legitimate inference.’” (quoting K-Mart Corp. 
v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 981 (Miss. 1999))). 
 142. Steven Hetcher, The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Standard to Amateur 
Digital Remix, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1275, 1326 (2010). 
 143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965). 
 144. Id. § 328D  cmt. b. 
 145. Id. § 328D  cmt. a. 
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Res ipsa loquitur, then, is a principle of evidence rather than a distinct 
cause of action that may be brought against another.146  Specifically, this 
principle allows a trier of fact to infer a defendant’s negligence, or specifically, 
a defendant’s breach of a duty of care that the law has assigned him, based 
upon his circumstances and situation.  So, for example, the law assigns a duty 
of reasonable care to be taken by everyone—from a driver behind the wheel of 
a car to a doctor who has been practicing medicine in a large city to a 
shopkeeper who has opened a store in a small town.  Traditionally, a cause of 
action for negligence may be made out against an individual who breaches his 
ascribed duty of care, thereby conferring harm upon another. 
In certain cases, however, a plaintiff is not situated so as to be able to 
allege with any specificity how, or even that, a breach of one’s duty of care 
occurred.  The paradigmatic example that most law students learn comes 
directly from Baron Pollock’s 1863 case, and it involves a barrel of flour that 
fell out of a place of business’s window and struck a pedestrian below.147 
Although the pedestrian may not have been able to ascertain how or even that a 
breach occurred, the fact of the breach was able to be inferred from the 
circumstances surrounding the incident; things like that do not fall from 
windows in the absence of someone’s negligence, or the breach of someone’s 
duty of care.148  Thus, the law supplies the missing piece of the plaintiff’s case 
by furnishing the requisite inference, and as long as the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that his injury was proximately caused by the incident inferred to 
have stemmed from the breach of the duty, the plaintiff may recover for the 
injury.  In this way, the law obviates the need for the provision of the specifics 
that the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to procure.  The rationale for 
its application is that there are some instances in which (1) an accident has 
occurred that would typically not occur in the absence of the breach of a duty 
of care;149 and (2) due to a lack of direct evidence, the plaintiff cannot be 
rationally expected to ascertain the origins of the harm that befell him with 
enough precision to sustain a claim in the absence of such an inference.150 
 
 146. Id.; see also, e.g., Jamey B. Johnson, Note, Torts—Res Ipsa Loquitur Is Inapplicable 
When a Plaintiff Offers Expert Testimony to Furnish a Complete Explanation of the Specific 
Cause of an Accident, 25 U. BALT. L. REV. 261, 263 (1996) (“Res ipsa loquitur is neither an 
independent tort doctrine nor a cause of action.  Rather, res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary 
principle, and, more specifically, it is a rule of circumstantial evidence.” (footnote omitted)). 
 147. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 299 (Exch.). 
 148. Id. at 301. 
 149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. c (1965). 
 150. See Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 301 (“A barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without 
some negligence, and to say that a plaintiff . . . must call witnesses from the warehouse to prove 
negligence seems to me preposterous.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a 
(1965) (“In its inception the principle of res ipsa loquitur was merely a rule of evidence, 
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The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is properly invoked when harm is caused 
by an agent or instrument somehow under the defendant’s control, there is no 
contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part, and 
the circumstances surrounding [the] accident are so unusual as to give rise to 
an inference of negligence or liability on the part of the defendant and that, 
under such circumstances, the only reasonable and fair conclusion is that the 
accident resulted from a breach of duty or omission on the part of the 
defendant.151 
So, the doctrine is properly invoked, for example, where a consumer is injured 
by a piece of glass that comes in a can of spinach that he purchased152 or where 
a patient awakes from an operation to find that a surgical tool was left inside of 
her and needs to be subsequently retrieved.153  Other examples furnished by the 
Restatement include: “objects falling from the defendant’s premises, the fall of 
an elevator, the escape of gas or water from mains or of electricity from wires 
or appliances, [and] the derailment of trains or the explosion of boilers.”154  In 
each of these situations, it is reasonable to conclude that the event at issue 
would not have transpired but for someone’s negligence.155  These types of 
events stand in stark contrast with occurrences like a person’s falling down a 
flight of stairs or a tire becoming flat, which may or may not have been 
brought about by someone’s negligence.156 
The doctrine is a creature of state law, and as such, its precise nature varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.157  Certain courts are prone to according more 
 
permitting the jury to draw from the occurrence of an unusual event the conclusion that it was the 
defendant’s fault.”). 
 151.  Desoto v. Ford Motor Co., 975 So. 2d 195, 198 (La. Ct. App. 2008); cf. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §328D cmt. o (1965) (“The inference arising from a res ipsa loquitur case 
may, however, be destroyed by sufficiently conclusive evidence . . . . that the event was caused by 
some outside agency for which he was not responsible, or that it was of a kind which commonly 
occurs without negligence on the part of anyone and could not be avoided by the exercise of all 
reasonable care . . . .”). 
 152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. e, illus. 1 (1965).  This example was 
taken from Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp., 145 N.E. 281 (Mass. 1924).  2 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS App. § 328D, at 60 (1966). 
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g, illus. 9 (1965).  This example was 
taken from Ales v. Ryan, 64 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1936).  2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS App. § 
328D, at 61 (1966). 
 154. Id. § 328D cmt. c; see also id. § 328D cmt. g, illus. 6, 8 & cmt. i, illus. 11 (providing 
more detailed hypothetical situations where the doctrine would apply). 
 155. Id. § 328D  cmt. c. 
 156. Id. § 328D  cmt. c (“The fact that a tire blows out, or that a man falls down stairs is not, 
in the absence of anything more, enough to permit the conclusion that there was negligence in 
inspecting the tire, or in the construction of the stairs, because it is common human experience 
that such events all too frequently occur without such negligence.”). 
 157. See id. § 328D cmt. m. 
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probative weight than are others to the circumstantial evidence at bar.158  In 
such courts, the doctrine gives rise to a presumption, under which the 
defendant must either somehow provide a compelling explanation for the 
evidence or be found liable.159  This is especially true in circumstances in 
which the defendant undertook some special obligation to the plaintiff, such as 
a doctor performing surgery on a patient.160  Other courts have found that the 
doctrine engenders nothing more than a permissible inference as to the absence 
of reasonable care taken, and the trier of fact is left as the arbiter as to its 
applicability.161 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has thus been referred to by some courts 
as “nothing more than a brand of circumstantial evidence,”162 but it is 
nonetheless a powerful force that militates against holding a plaintiff’s lack of 
access to crucial evidence against him where the totality of the circumstances 
indicates that there is not a sound reason to do so.  Moreover, while “[t]he 
requirement does not mean that the possibility of other causes must be 
altogether eliminated,” it does mean that “their likelihood must be so reduced 
that the greater probability lies at the defendant’s door.”163  Therefore, the 
doctrine, itself, may be seen as a “shortcut” of sorts, but rather than one that 
clears courts’ dockets by disposing of cases in which amassing the kind of 
evidence a plaintiff needs is difficult, one that creates a mechanism for 
bypassing the chasm between what can reasonably be proven and what likely 
happened, and making the necessary inferential leap. 
B. Defamation Per Se 
The principle of defamation per se is another principle that highlights 
courts’ willingness to permit a plaintiff to maintain her case, and indeed to 
prevail, where she may have difficulty proving the necessary elements of a tort 
due to her situation within the facts, but where the context and the totality of 
the circumstances indicate that an inference is warranted.  As is the case with 
res ipsa loquitur, the resulting inference or presumption is made in the 
plaintiff’s favor. 
Defamation consists of the publication of a communication—either 
written, which is libel, or spoken, which is slander—that is both false and 
 
 158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. m (1965). 
 159. Id. (“Some courts have tended in the past, and some few still tend, to give res ipsa 
loquitur the effect of a presumption, which requires a directed verdict for the plaintiff if the 
defendant offers no evidence to rebut it.”). 
 160. See id. § 328D cmt. g, illus. 9. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Morejon v. Rais Constr. Co., 851 N.E.2d 1143, 1149 (N.Y. 2006). 
 163. Dermotossian v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 492 N.E.2d 1200, 1205 (N.Y. 1986) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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injurious to the reputation of another.164  Under common law, all libel is 
actionable per se, meaning that the plaintiff need not proffer proof of either 
actual or special damages, and these damages, which may include the harm 
one endures to her reputation and emotional harm stemming from the 
publication, will be presumed.165  In contrast, however, slander is not presumed 
to be actionable absent a plaintiff’s proffer of evidence to establish the 
existence of special damages.166  The Restatement (Second) of Torts uses the 
term “special harm” to define special damages as: 
[T]he loss of something having economic or pecuniary value.  In its origin, this 
goes back to the ancient conflict of jurisdiction between the royal and the 
ecclesiastical courts, in which the former acquired jurisdiction over some kinds 
of defamation only because they could be found to have resulted in “temporal” 
rather than “spiritual” damage.  The limitation has persisted in the requirement 
that special harm, to serve as the foundation of an action for slander that is not 
actionable per se, must be “temporal,” “material,” pecuniary or economic in 
character.167 
A court, however, is permitted to find as a matter of law that certain 
statements that are likely to injure another’s personal or professional reputation 
constitute defamation per se.168  Courts typically find that a communication has 
this tendency when it contains “a serious charge of incapacity or misconduct in 
words so obviously and naturally harmful that proof of their injurious character 
can be dispensed with.”169  Specifically, the law in most jurisdictions considers 
words to amount to defamation per se if they impute (1) criminal conduct or 
offense; (2) a loathsome disease; (3) misconduct, lack of integrity, or inability 
in a person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation; or (4) sexual 
misconduct.170 
 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (“A communication is defamatory 
if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community 
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”); id. § 568(1)–(2) (distinguishing 
between libel and slander); id. § 577 (describing what is considered a “publication”). 
 165. Id. § 569 & cmt. b. 
 166. Id. § 575 cmt. a; cf. id. § 571 (allowing certain slander claims to be actionable per se 
when the alleged slander imputes criminal conduct on the defendant); id. § 574 (allowing slander 
claims concerning sexual misconduct to be actionable per se). 
 167. Id. § 575 cmt. b. 
 168. Id. § 570. 
 169. Quilici v. Second Amendment Found., 769 F.2d 414, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 268 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also 
Schrader v. Eli Lilly & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 263 (Ind. 1994) (discussing what type of 
communications are considered defamatory). 
 170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 570 (1977).  See generally id. § 571 (criminal 
offenses); id. § 572 (loathsome diseases); id. § 573 (professional misconduct); id. § 574 (sexual 
misconduct). 
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California, for example, proposes the following jury instruction for 
presumed damages, which do not require proof from a plaintiff who has 
established defamation per se: 
Presumed damages are those damages that necessarily result from the 
publication of defamatory matter and are presumed to exist.  They include, but 
are not limited to, reasonable compensation for loss of personal [or 
professional] reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt feelings.  No definite 
standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed by law by which to fix 
reasonable compensation for presumed damages, and no evidence of actual 
harm is required.  Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount 
of such reasonable compensation.  In making an award for presumed damages 
you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the 
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable.171 
The presumption that damages inured to the plaintiff as a result of the 
publication is thus afforded to the plaintiff without the requirement that the 
plaintiff procure and proffer evidence of these damages on her own.172  Indeed, 
“[t]he doctrine of defamation per se was developed out of a need to provide a 
remedy for a person whose reputation was damaged by the very utterance of 
the defamatory words, even though the person could not point to a specific 
pecuniary loss.”173 
C. Inherently Dangerous, Unreasonably Unsafe 
In a similar vein, plaintiffs who sustain harm as a result of others’ 
abnormally dangerous activities need not show that the others were somehow 
remiss or negligent as to their execution of these activities; they need only 
show that the others were engaged in the activities and that the activities 
caused the harm.174 
So, for example, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[o]ne 
who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm 
to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although 
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.”175  When deciding 
 
 171. CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.10.1 (10th ed. 2010). 
 172. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977) (explaining that some 
courts require defamatory meaning of publication to be evident on its face without reference to 
extrinsic facts, otherwise plaintiff must show proof of harm).  See generally id. § 621 cmt. a 
(“[G]eneral damages are imposed for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for the harm that 
the publication has caused to his reputation . . . . [G]eneral damages have traditionally been 
awarded not only for harm to reputation that is proved to have occurred, but also, in the absence 
of this proof, for harm to reputation that would normally be assumed to flow from a defamatory 
publication of the nature involved.”). 
 173. Synygy, Inc. v. Scott-Levin, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 570, 581 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). 
 175. Id. § 519(1). 
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whether an activity is, in fact, “abnormally dangerous” so as to warrant this 
imposition of strict liability, courts are urged by the Restatement to weigh the 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or 
chattels of others; (b) [the] likelihood that the harm that results from it will be 
great; (c) [the] inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) [the] extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) [the] 
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) [the] 
extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes.176 
The resolution of the issue, a question of law, essentially boils down to 
whether “the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or 
because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of 
strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with 
all reasonable care.”177  This doctrine has been traditionally applied to 
activities including blasting, keeping wild animals, and other activities that 
courts feel confer such a high degree of risk that a great magnitude of harm 
will result that cannot be prevented through the exercise of due care.178 
Clearly, then, strict liability is imposed absent a showing by the plaintiff in 
such a case that the defendant has been remiss in the execution of a duty of 
care because of the law’s desire to deter certain types of activities performed in 
unusual places and to apportion risk to those who, by the very nature of what 
they are doing, expose others to a certain amount of endangerment irrespective 
of how much care is taken.179  The end result, however, is that a plaintiff who 
is harmed as a result of such an activity need not supply what would normally 
be vital information or allegations as to precisely what went wrong so as to 
generate the harm, in order to recover. 
 
 176. Id. § 520. 
 177. Id. § 520 cmt. f. 
 178. Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng’g Co., 79 A.2d 591, 595 (Conn. 1951) 
(“[W]hen one engages in the inherently dangerous operation of blasting with dynamite under such 
circumstances that the person or property of another is necessarily or obviously exposed to the 
danger of probable injury, he does so at his peril.  He is absolutely liable for damages which 
result from that blasting whether he was negligent in his conduct of the operation or not.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 507 (1977) (possessors of wild animals subject to liability 
even when utmost care was taken to prevent harm); id. § 509 (possessors of abnormally 
dangerous domestic animals subject to liability even when utmost care was taken to prevent 
harm); id. § 520A (imposing liability for damage caused by overflying airplanes even when the 
operator has exercised utmost care); id. § 520 cmt. h. 
 179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1977) (“[T]he fact that the activity is 
inappropriate to the place where it is carried on is a factor of importance in determining whether 
the danger is an abnormal one.”); id. § 520 cmt. k (discussing how value to the community, 
among multiple factors, is considered when determining whether an activity is regarded as 
abnormally dangerous). 
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IV.  EVALUATING THE BIG PICTURE OF THE “SHORTCUTS” TREND IN 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
As stated, the shortcuts discussed in this Article, while previously 
criticized individually, should be viewed as part of a larger, broader trend, 
occurring over decades, in which judges are systemically and thoughtlessly 
disposing of or skewing certain viable employment discrimination cases.  
Seeing them as part of a larger pathology of sorts invites a crucial discussion as 
to what judicially and societally-held attitudes and biases may be skewing 
employment discrimination jurisprudence. 
However, older, more established areas of law, like tort law, have 
traditionally furnished inferences and presumptions that, rather than helping 
defendants derail cases brought against them, actually aid plaintiffs in 
establishing necessary elements of their cases under certain circumstances.  
Obviously, the circumstances in which these inferences and presumptions are 
activated in tort law do not perfectly mirror those which arise in employment 
cases.  Nevertheless, the existence of and rationales for these inferences and 
presumptions are instructive.  This Article does not advocate for the 
accordance of any presumption, inference, or other “shortcut” for employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, but merely for a reasoned look by a court at their 
cases, unfettered by the imposition of virtually baseless, prejudicial, and 
pointless defendant-favoring shortcuts. 
A. A Trend Involving the Misuse of Flawed Doctrines 
As stated, employment discrimination law contains “shortcuts” through 
analysis, like the stray comment doctrine, the temporal nexus requirement, and 
the same actor inference, that substitute undue focus on a single fact for a 
comprehensive analysis of the fact in tandem with others.  These shortcuts are 
susceptible to being used improperly in the context of summary judgment 
analysis, but each doctrine, as it has arisen in the substantive law, is somewhat 
flawed to begin with.  In the first place, the logic underlying these shortcuts is 
inconsistent.  For example, on one hand, it has been noted that the same actor 
inference provides a wide allowance for a decision maker to decide to fire an 
individual that he hired years earlier and retain the possibly groundless 
assumption that he was not motivated by unlawful considerations at any 
time.180  On the other hand, inexplicably, the stray comment doctrine posits 
that the mindset ascribable to a racist comment, for example, must be 
presumed to not be present when the comment is followed by an adverse action 
just a short time later.181  This asymmetrical treatment of the concepts of the 
 
 180. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 181. See Stone, supra note 11 (manuscript at 28) (“The same actor inference persists in the 
assumption that one who hires an individual cannot subsequently discriminate against that person 
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passage of time and the likelihood that a bias will foment, inhere, or change 
over the course of time reveals the internal inconsistencies among these 
shortcuts to summary judgment.182 
The temporal nexus requirement involving the time that elapses between a 
protected activity and an alleged retaliatory act, like the lapse mentioned above 
in the analysis of the stray comment doctrine, also stands in stark contrast with 
the same actor inference.  In the case of the same actor inference, the court 
presumes that one who, for any number of possible reasons, performed a single 
act a number of years prior is incapable of harboring the alleged intent, 
mindset, or motivation.183  On the other hand, this same court may very well 
foreclose the possibility that an actor acted with an alleged retaliatory intent, 
mindset, or motivation when he did something that would otherwise amount to 
retaliation, simply because an arbitrary temporal cutoff elapsed.184 
Additionally, as discussed, each individual doctrine has come under fire 
for having underlying assumptions and premises about the ways in which bias 
is formed, fomented, expressed, cultivated, and altered that are simply out of 
touch with and disconnected from what we know about human behavior.185  
Finally, courts’ hasty or misguided applications of these shortcuts in various 
contexts can cause them to unwittingly flout or undermine the federal rules of 
evidence or procedure that should underlie and govern their analyses.186  
 
because of his or her protected class status should inhere over a period as long as several years.  
At the same time, judge-made employment discrimination law simultaneously adheres to the 
belief that a comment capable of evincing protected class bias, or even animus, may be rendered 
wholly irrelevant because a decision-maker uttered it outside of the precise time frame or context 
of the adverse action at issue.” (footnote omitted)). 
 182. See id. (manuscript at 28–29) (“There is an extreme asymmetry between the large 
amount of time that courts will allow between the hiring of a plaintiff and an adverse action 
where the court permits the same actor inference to take hold and create the assumption that the 
decision-maker in question could not have discriminated, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, 
the relatively short amount of time that some jurisdictions will permit to elapse before courts 
divest what might be probative comments of their evidentiary value.”). 
 183. See supra Part II.A. 
 184. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 185. See supra notes 86–87, 104, 129–30 and accompanying text. 
 186. It is interesting to note that courts appear somewhat confused as to the proper interplay 
between their various deployments of shortcuts on summary judgment motions and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  Under Rule 401, “[r]elevant evidence” is defined broadly as “evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 401.  Further, “all relevant evidence is admissible,” FED. R. EVID. 402, but “may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” FED. R. EVID. 403.  In civil cases, Rule 
404 excludes evidence of character, traits, crimes, wrongs, or acts “for the purpose of proving 
[action] in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”  FED. R. EVID. 404. 
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  Different courts use the word “stray” to mean different things.  Some courts adjudicating 
summary judgment motions seem to assume that a comment deemed “stray” is not relevant 
without explaining or really establishing why the standard enumerated in Rule 401 has not been 
met.  See, e.g., Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that stray 
remarks are “too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a finding of 
. . . discrimination” (quoting Gagné v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 1989)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); McDonald v. Best Buy Co., No. 05-4056, 2010 WL 173893, 
at *1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2010) (“As a general rule, stray remarks by non-decision makers are 
irrelevant and not admissible.”); Greenfield v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 04-71086, 2006 WL 
2927546, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2006) (“‘Comments made long before the adverse 
employment action and comments’ by non-decisionmaker[s] have no probative value in a 
disparate treatment case.” (quoting Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 F. App’x 275, 
280 (6th Cir. 2004))); see also Sperino, supra note 11, at 791 (“Under the stray remarks doctrine, 
courts often consider comments to be irrelevant to the issue of whether discrimination occurred if 
those comments are made by nonsupervisors, are remote in time from the employment decision at 
hand, or demonstrate bias against another protected class.”).  But see Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 
303, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“At the summary judgment stage of proceedings the court is not to 
weigh the evidence,” and a comment deemed stray by a district court may nonetheless be wholly 
“relevant to [the] claim of . . . discrimination, illustrative of [the decision maker’s] animus . . . and 
properly considered in evaluating whether the totality of evidence shows the [defendant’s] 
explanation was pretextual.”); Pulsipher v. Clark Cnty., No. 2:08-cv-01374-RCJ-LRL, 2010 WL 
5437252, at *9 (D. Nev. Dec. 27, 2010) (“A discriminatory comment made in 2001 is relevant to 
alleged discriminatory actions taken in 2006, because evidence of a past discriminatory attitude 
affects the probability that an action taken later was motivated by discriminatory intent, a fact 
which is of consequence to a discrimination claim. . . . Defendants may certainly argue to the jury 
that the lapse in time makes the evidence weak-Plaintiff must of course prove intent, . . . but 
relevance under Rule 401 is an either-or concept, not a sliding scale.”).  Other courts seem to 
conflate or confuse the ideas of relevance and sufficiency of the evidence when assigning the 
term stray to a piece of proffered evidence.  See, e.g., Bugos v. Ricoh Corp., No. 07-20757, 2008 
WL 3876548, at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2008) (noting that some stray comments “are appropriately 
taken into account when analyzing the evidence,” but granting summary judgment because the 
proffered stray comments “are indeed the only evidence of pretext, and as such, they are not 
probative” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  For an insightful discussion of the relationship between the same actor inference and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, see Martin, supra note 12, at 393 n.330 (While “same-actor evidence 
is at best marginally relevant to the circumstances resulting in adverse action against the plaintiff . 
. . . [It] is extremely prejudicial because, ironically, the very existence of the same-actor 
presumption demonstrates how natural it is for judges to overvalue it. . . . Thus, its marginal 
relevance is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial and misleading effects.”).  Professor 
Martin also argues that 
applying the same-actor inference in this way is akin to the admission of character 
evidence that reflects one’s propensity to engage in certain behavior.  Thus, the evidence 
is excludable under Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which rejects evidence of prior acts in 
order to prove that an action is in conformity with one’s character. . . . [C]ourts generally 
characterize same-actor evidence as general propensity evidence.  That is, they accept the 
employer’s argument that it is not a bigot because it hired the black plaintiff, thus it is 
reasonable to infer that the employer would act in conformity with that character in its 
later dealings with the plaintiff.  Therefore, when it fired her, it did so for a legitimate 
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Indeed, a proper application of the summary judgment standard entails looking 
at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and examining 
whether, through this lens, a triable issue of fact may be discerned.187 
B. A Trend that Veers Away from Tort Law 
The rigid cutoffs and other shortcuts described above stand in stark 
contrast with tort law, which, under certain circumstances, invokes inferences, 
presumptions, and other shortcuts that aid plaintiffs both in getting before a 
trier and, more significantly, in making out a successful case.188  In a typical 
employment discrimination disparate treatment scenario, as in a typical 
negligence or intentional tort situation, the plaintiff must ordinarily come 
forward with some evidence of that which resides exclusively within the 
province of the defendant.  This may include the state of mind of a key actor, 
the precise details surrounding a mishap, or the level of care or precaution 
exercised by a defendant behind closed doors.189  As discussed, tort law 
observes that under certain circumstances, it is not reasonable to deny that the 
breach of some duty of care occurred, and it is also unreasonable to expect the 
plaintiff to procure and set forth the precise mechanism by which the breach 
took place.190  Employment discrimination shortcuts, by contrast, contemplate 
a plaintiff who has to prove a decision maker’s largely undisclosed motivation 
 
reason and not because it is racist or acted based on racism.  This reasoning seems in 
direct contravention to the boundaries of the rules of evidence. 
Id.  She concludes that 
while Rule 404 often precludes plaintiffs’ use of prior acts of animus to prove individual 
disparate treatment, the rule often benefits employers precisely because courts accept and 
apply the same-actor principle. . . . Ironically, the courts’ interpretive rule making that 
‘chips away’ at plaintiffs’ evidence of pretext under Title VII has resulted in a common-
law modification of the Rules of Evidence. 
Id. 
 187. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
587–88 (1985). 
 188. See supra Part III. 
 189. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“The ultimate 
question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is 
whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”); see also Tristin K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment 
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 112 (2003) (“Traditional disparate treatment theory 
conceptualizes discrimination as individual, measurable, and static, looking into the state of mind 
of a particular decisionmaker at a discrete point in time.  Disparate treatment doctrine has long 
been understood to require a showing of intentional discrimination, often defined in terms of 
conscious motivation to discriminate.”); Martin, supra note 11, at 1127 n.28 (“State of mind of 
the actor became center stage in workplace law when the Supreme Court devised a framework for 
analyzing individual claims of discrimination under Title VII in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).”). 
 190. See supra Part III.A. 
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in acting, but who has some kind of evidence—like a comment—that may very 
well yield a keen insight into that motivation.  These shortcuts can strip that 
comment of its potential probative value to a trier of fact on the basis of an 
isolated, often unexamined aspect of its utterance, like the precise time, place, 
or context in which it was said. 
Thus, in the paradigmatic example used in torts classes to teach the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a barrel of flour falls out of a bakery’s window 
several stories up and hurts a plaintiff below.  It may be said that on one hand, 
the barrel could not have fallen out of the window absent some lapse in the 
bakery’s proper execution of its assigned duty of care to those who walked 
below its window.191  It also may be said that the plaintiff who sustains the 
harm below has no realistic way of ascertaining precisely where or how the 
bakery was remiss so as to cause his harm; he merely knows that he has been 
hurt.192  For these reasons, the law feels that it is both safe and just to supply 
this plaintiff with the element of his claim that sets forth the breach of the 
imposed duty of care that proximately caused his harm. 
On the other hand, an employment discrimination plaintiff with a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, and even with some evidence 
to help establish pretext, but who happens to have been fired by the same 
person who hired her, will not only have to make out her affirmative case, but 
also initially rebut an inference of nondiscrimination in order for her case to 
survive.  Another plaintiff with a sturdy prima facie case of retaliation may 
find herself unable to keep her case viable simply because of the time frame in 
which events transpired—and the relevant lag may be a matter of mere months 
or even weeks.  This is simply because a shortcut dictates that this time frame 
is too long as a matter of law to permit a trier of fact to evaluate the totality of 
the circumstances. 
These employment discrimination plaintiffs are besieged by hurdles that 
are potentially lethal to their cases at the outset.  This is despite the fact that 
they, like the plaintiff harmed by the falling barrel of flour, are not ideally 
situated to proffer evidence as to the typically undisclosed mindsets of decision 
makers upon which their cases hinge.  Moreover, to the extent that these 
plaintiffs have windows, insights, or clues as to those mindsets—in the form of 
comments proffered as evidence―these comments will often be summarily 
deemed “stray” and rendered incapable of helping the plaintiffs’ cases to so 
much as survive summary judgment.193  In any event, the plaintiffs’ evidence 
 
 191. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Exch.). 
 192. Id. at 300; see also Larkin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 389, 391–92 (La. 
1957) (noting that res ipsa should be used when “the circumstances [surrounding the] . . . 
accident are of such an unusual character as to . . . [give rise to an] inference that the accident was 
due to the negligence of the [defendant] . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 193. See supra Part II.B. 
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of discrimination, rare and hard to come by as it may be, will often only be 
considered at all if and after courts apply a potential series of defendant-
favoring shortcuts that substitute carelessly-applied labels for reasoned 
consideration. 
C. A Trend That is Out of Step with the Realities of the Contemporary 
Workplace 
Because unacceptable utterances that may reflect biases have become 
taboo in the modern workplace, it is particularly deleterious to a plaintiff’s case 
to allow a shortcut to take what could be construed as powerful evidence by a 
rational trier and deplete it of its force. 
Anti-discrimination law has, over time, both educated and influenced 
employers and decision makers.  While this has been beneficial, it has 
inoculated individuals in a sense, making them resistant to the biases that 
plagued their predecessors, who might have had their prejudices fuelled by 
non-exposure to members of protected classes.  In any event, knowledge of the 
law and the knowledge of the stigma that comes with violating it has imbued 
most decision makers with a cognizance that overtly discriminatory behavior 
can harm them both personally (in terms of social stigma/alienation) and 
professionally (in terms of on-the-job reputation and legal liabilities and 
ramifications).  This has operated to cause even those who clung to and 
harbored bias after its expression was made taboo by Title VII to mask, 
suppress, or otherwise veil their true feelings or motives.194  Perhaps most 
pernicious, however, are those who harbor racial, gender, and other biases and 
would like to or do act upon them, but whom the law and the pervasive culture 
of (at least outward) tolerance that was ushered in its wake, cause to suppress 
them to the point that they become subconscious or unconscious biases.  Such 
less-than-conscious biases, however, nonetheless impel attitudes, impressions, 
and ultimately decisions in the workplace.195  Thus, for many reasons, many 
decision makers in the workplace wind up, at least on some level, motivated by 
 
 194. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. 
L. REV. 741, 741 (2005) (“Gone are the days of ‘Whites Only’ signs on the doors of offices 
unwilling to offer a job to an African-American applicant.  No longer do many employers tell 
female applicants directly that they should stay home and have babies.  But discrimination is still 
pervasive, now more often in the form of stereotyping or unconscious bias.”). 
 195. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 
(2006) (discussing behavioral realism in the context of defining and identifying discriminatory 
motivation); Hart, supra note 194 (discussing Title VII’s ability to remedy unconscious 
discrimination). 
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bias, prejudice, or animus of some sort in their decision-making, but refrain 
from any outward expression of this underlying motivation.196 
To the extent that a plaintiff alleging discrimination in violation of Title 
VII is, in fact, able to proffer a corresponding comment made by the decision 
maker, whether or not it was uttered in the context of the specific adverse 
employment action at issue, there is a fairly sizable chance that that comment 
may in fact belie the true, but undisclosed mindset or beliefs that motivate that 
individual in numerous contexts.197  This is not to say that an alleged comment 
was, in fact, actually uttered, or that if it was actually uttered, it is necessarily 
indicative of a discriminatory mindset.  Moreover, if it is indicative of a 
discriminatory mindset, that is not to say that the mindset was the true 
motivation for the adverse action at issue.  It is merely to say that courts should 
take notice of how hard evidence of employment discrimination can be to 
come by and should be cognizant of how deleterious shortcuts can be when 
they operate to discount that evidence.  This is not identical to the situation of a 
plaintiff who invokes res ipsa loquitur because what befell him cannot be said 
to have happened but for the existence of someone’s negligence.  However, 
while the plaintiff invoking that doctrine seeks to be supplied with an inference 
that will permit him to affirmatively establish an element that he needs to make 
out to win his case, an employment discrimination plaintiff proffering what she 
fears will be written off as a “stray comment” seeks only to survive the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion and proceed with her claim before a 
trier of fact, who will be allowed to consider all appropriate, relevant evidence.  
Inasmuch as it may be said or recognized that one who is proven to have 
uttered a remark capable of being reasonably construed so as to evince 
discriminatory bias is likely to be motivated by such bias on any number of 
levels, so ought a plaintiff proffering such a remark be given an ample 
opportunity to have the remark evaluated in the context of all of a case’s 
relevant facts. 
As with a tort plaintiff invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an 
employment discrimination plaintiff is not ideally situated to procure the 
evidence that she will need to demonstrate another person’s motivation or state 
of mind at the time that a given decision was made.198  Indeed, the Eighth 
 
 196. See Hart, supra note 194, at 751 (“It is an exceedingly rare case in which a plaintiff has 
true direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such as a statement from the employer that ‘we 
don’t hire Mexicans, so you can’t have this job.’”). 
 197. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 340 (1987) (An “inadvertent slip of the tongue [is] 
not random.”). 
 198. Trina Jones, Race, Economic Class, and Employment Opportunity, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 57, 84–85 (2009) (“[C]ourts have demonstrated increasing hostility to employment 
discrimination claims, and this burden is not easily met in an era when much overt discrimination 
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Circuit has repeatedly stated that “summary judgment should be used sparingly 
in the context of employment discrimination and/or retaliation cases where 
direct evidence of intent is often difficult or impossible to obtain.”199  Shortcuts 
facilitate the rote, thoughtless conferral of summary judgment and improperly 
skew cases that get to trial in favor of defendants without much reasoning or 
justification.  Other circuits have acknowledged that in an employment 
discrimination case, “the defendant will rarely admit to having said or done 
what is alleged,”200 and that in light of the general scarcity of so-called 
“smoking gun” evidence, methods of indirect proof and the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework are utilized.201 This, unfortunately, leaves 
a plaintiff without smoking gun evidence largely disadvantaged because (1) the 
plaintiff, even having made out her prima facie case, must still shoulder the 
ultimate burden of persuasion as to the allegation of discrimination and (2) 
absent favorable statistical evidence or evidence of comparator treatment, one 
or more so-called “stray comments” without a sufficient nexus to the decision 
at hand may be all the plaintiff has to keep her case afloat. 
D. A Trend that Demands Attention 
It is extremely important for scholars and others who observe and 
comment upon trends in employment discrimination jurisprudence to be 
cognizant of the asymmetry in the shortcuts—both the asymmetry within the 
jurisprudence and the asymmetry seen in the way in which employment 
discrimination law and tort law each treat plaintiffs.  In the first place, the 
 
has gone underground, meaning smoking-gun evidence of unlawful motive is not readily found.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 199. Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 2006).  The court in this 
case also specifically noted that “no separate summary judgment standard exists for 
discrimination or retaliation cases and that such cases are not immune from summary judgment.”  
Id. at 1118 (citing Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no 
‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and it remains a useful 
pretrial tool to determine whether or not any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a 
trial.”)); see also Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(noting that “summary judgment is not disfavored and is designed for ‘every action’” and that 
there is not an exception to the application of summary judgment for discrimination cases). 
 200. Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 201. See, e.g., Burgess v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr., No. 98-35417, 1999 WL 974182, at *2 (9th 
Cir. Oct. 22, 1999) (“In most employment discrimination cases, direct evidence of discriminatory 
motive is unavailable or difficult to obtain. Therefore, the Supreme Court has set forth an indirect 
method of proof which relies on presumptions and shifting burdens of production.”); Bhaya v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 1990) (“We have repeatedly emphasized 
that direct evidence in the form of a ‘smoking gun’ is not required to prove discrimination.”); see 
also Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[T]here is usually 
no ‘smoking gun’ evidence of intentional discrimination.”), overruled on other grounds by 
Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp, 54 F.3d 1089, 1099 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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practical ramifications of having a claim—any claim—improperly foreclosed 
at the summary judgment stage are immense.  Most employment 
discrimination cases never get to trial, but are either dismissed or settled.202  In 
an age of prohibitively expensive litigation costs and defendants’ growing 
fears of the public relations and so-called “floodgates” ramifications that flow 
from protracted litigation, it is the case that once an employment 
discrimination plaintiff has survived summary judgment, she has, in essence 
won her case, because the defendant is much more likely to settle.203 
To the extent that shortcuts reflect legitimate, grounded inferences that are 
fairly imposed at trial, and to the extent that judges are not substituting their 
evaluation of evidence for that which a reasonable juror can find, they may get 
a court to the right, expedient result, albeit without sufficient explanation or 
analysis.  The problem, though, as discussed, is that this is rarely the case; on 
summary judgment, courts frequently apply misconceived shortcuts that lack 
grounding in any sound reasoning, and they frequently do so in a misguided 
manner, divesting a trier of fact of a chance to give reasoned, holistic 
consideration to all admissible evidence.  To the extent that these employment 
discrimination shortcuts, both within the jurisprudence, and in contrast with 
other areas of law, unfairly skew toward grants of summary judgment to 
defendants in employment discrimination cases, they are noteworthy. 
In the second place, awareness of these trends and, more importantly, of 
the underlying attitudes and beliefs that they evince should be critical to those 
who observe the state of employment discrimination jurisprudence.204  The 
development and proliferation of shortcuts in employment discrimination 
jurisprudence reveal a great deal about judicial and societal attitudes toward 
employment discrimination cases and toward the plaintiffs that bring them.  
The “shortcuts” explored in this Article that have existed in tort law for 
centuries are rooted in courts’ desires to obviate the need for plaintiffs to 
procure hard-to-obtain evidence that supports allegations that, based upon the 
outlying circumstances, need not be proven.  For example, proving the breach 
 
 202. Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment 
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 46 n.4 (2005) (citing Clermont & 
Schwab, supra note 2, at  440–41); see also Selmi, supra note 1, at 573 (“Even where those cases 
succeed in the lower court, they will still have a substantial chance of being reversed on appeal, 
and the difficulty of winning cases should also counsel in favor of settling cases wherever a 
reasonable settlement is within reach.”); supra note 1. 
 203. See Berger, supra note 202, at 48–49. 
 204. “Plaintiffs are . . . half as successful when their cases are tried before a judge than a jury, 
and success rates are more than fifty percent below the rate of other claims.”  Selmi, supra note 1, 
at 560–61.  “[E]mployment discrimination plaintiffs have long had difficulty with trials before a 
judge; indeed, only claims filed by prisoners tend to have a lower success rate.”  Id. at 561 (citing 
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 
77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989)). 
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of an assigned duty of care or special damages in certain types of defamation 
cases becomes unnecessary because it is so logically presumable that based on 
what occurred, these things must exist.  The logic employed to discern their 
existence presumes that a plaintiff simply will not be privy to certain 
information or be easily able to access certain evidence. 
By way of contrast, the logic in the employment discrimination shortcuts—
the logic that says that an individual’s simple act performed years prior 
engenders an assumption that the individual could not have acted with bias (on 
any level) more recently, while an individual’s discriminatory speech against a 
group is wholly not relevant to a decision that he might have made weeks, or 
even days later—is dumbfounding.  This flawed logic bespeaks a fundamental 
mistrust of plaintiffs’ allegations of intentional discrimination, and the question 
as to the genesis of this mistrust thus presents itself. 
E. A Trend with Deep Roots 
The question of why judges have created these shortcuts and seemingly 
confined them largely to the employment discrimination field is also of 
seminal importance.  An obvious response is that courts, and specifically 
judges, may harbor an increased skepticism, and perhaps even hostility toward 
plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination.  Certainly scholars have posited 
as much.205  It is important to ask why this would be the case. 
 
 205. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Personality” 
Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 186 (1997) (“[T]he Court’s ready acceptance of a 
‘personality clash’ as a non-discriminatory justification ignores the effects of unconscious bias 
and stereotyping and opens a gaping loophole in the law.”); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The 
Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” 
Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2003) (noting the dramatic shift in presumption 
regarding discrimination and arguing that such a shift “should only be undertaken carefully and 
consciously”); Hart, supra note 194, at 790 (“Unfortunately for Title VII plaintiffs, the hostility 
of the federal judiciary to employment discrimination claims has been widely recognized.”); 
Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61 
LA. L. REV. 539, 546 (2001); Malveaux, supra note 2, at 85–86, 95 (noting the resistance of 
judges toward employment discrimination cases and noting that several scholars have also 
acknowledged this fact); Martin, supra note 12, at 368 (“Overall, the same-actor principle is 
symptomatic of the courts’ skepticism about employment discrimination matters, particularly 
those involving women and persons of color.”); Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While 
Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1003 (2007) 
(“Hostility to the litigation process itself seems the best explanation of how the same Court could 
be so willing to disallow employment lawsuits for supposed timing and procedural failures, but, 
when it deems a lawsuit to be properly filed, so willing to allow the plaintiff leeway as to burdens 
of proof and evidence.” (citations omitted)); Selmi, supra note 1, at 564–65; Leland Ware, 
Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in 
Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
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Ever since jury trials were afforded to Title VII plaintiffs via the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,206 scholars have intimated that having a jury versus a 
judge sit as a trier of fact in an employment discrimination case would likely 
confer an advantage on a plaintiff because, in the words of one scholar, “judges 
in the United States are perceived as less likely than a lay jury to be 
sympathetic to and deliver a verdict in favor of a plaintiff.”207  Moreover, as 
another scholar pointed out, when an employment discrimination plaintiff 
requests a jury trial, this may not only mean that she is counting on jurors’ bias 
toward discrimination plaintiffs; it can also “reflect a realization that jurors 
have an equal or weightier bias against the large corporate defendant.”208 
Judges may see allegations of discrimination as simultaneously so difficult 
to relate to or identify with (especially if they have never felt discriminated 
against) and so grave, that they may respond with incredulity.209  Indeed, 
judges may be under the misapprehension that society has somehow 
transcended the problem of unlawful bias, and thus the problem of 
discrimination in employment.210  Judges adjudicating employment 
 
37, 63 (2000); Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 575, 585 
(2003) (describing “unsympathetic” application of antidiscrimination laws by the courts). 
 206. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (1991) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006)) (“If a complaining party seeks compensatory or 
punitive damages under this section . . . any party may demand a trial by jury . . . .”). 
 207. Donna M. Gitter, French Criminalization of Racial Employment Discrimination 
Compared to the Imposition of Civil Penalties in the United States, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 488, 521 
(1994); see also Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: What Does It Mean and What 
Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 312 (1992) (“The availability of trial by jury is a 
significant victory for the plaintiffs’ bar.”); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating 
“National Origin” Discrimination under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 841–42 (1994) 
(“[T]he Court’s most recent decision interpreting Title VII again demonstrates persistent hostility 
toward civil rights plaintiffs.”). 
 208. Kerry R. Lewis, Note, A Reexamination of the Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial Under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 TULSA L.J. 571, 580 (1991); see also Loudon, supra 
note 207, at 312 (“It is a well-known fact that juries tend to be more sympathetic to the ‘little 
guy,’ as opposed to the ‘heartless’ corporate entity.”). 
 209. See Martin, supra note 12, at 398 (suggesting that judicial bias against employment 
discrimination plaintiffs may be due to an “incapacity to relate to discrimination”); cf. Rory K. 
Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s 
Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 484 (1999) (stating that “[u]nconscious racial identification 
with white defendants and/or victims by white prosecutors, judges and jurors, and a concomitant 
failure to identify or empathize with strangers from other racial groups . . . . [is part of] ‘a 
universal dilemma in human relations’” (quoting RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE 
LAW 350 (1997))). 
 210. See Malveaux, supra note 2, at 93–94 (“With the election of the first African-American 
President of the United States, Barack Obama, there has been a particularly acute focus on 
whether American society has become ‘post-racial.’”); Zimmer, supra note 16, at 601 (“There is 
data suggesting that federal judges, without regard to their political background, have come to 
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discrimination cases, then, appear to observers as increasingly skeptical of 
these cases and of the plaintiffs who bring them.211  In fact, while those who 
observe workplace trends have remarked that the vehicles and mechanisms by 
which bias operates have become more nuanced and refined over time, as the 
dictates of the law have created a new social appropriateness and fear of 
liability,212 those who observe the perception of workplace bias by others have 
observed that “[t]he reality that discriminators are more sophisticated, 
secretive, or subtle is decreasingly being viewed as normative.”213  Thus, as 
 
view discrimination as less of a problem than it once was and now only involving the 
idiosyncratic behavior of a few employers.”). 
 211. See Stephen Plass, Private Dispute Resolution and the Future of Institutional Workplace 
Discrimination, 54 HOW. L.J. 45, 67, 68–69 (2010) (noting that “[w]ith the belief that 
employment discrimination and its mutations have been arrested and eliminated, judges now 
adopt a very skeptical view of plaintiffs” and that “[a]lthough case reporters and the EEOC 
docket provide evidence that large numbers of workers suspect or experience discrimination, 
judges and society at large increasingly view workplace bias as isolated or aberrant conduct”); 
Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1153–54 (2008) 
(“These hurdles are indicative of what I refer to as an ‘insider bias’ in the enforcement of 
antidiscrimination law—meaning the courts tend to reflect the insider view that discrimination is 
rare and that most claims are meritless, rather than the opposing view that discrimination is 
pervasive.”). 
 212. See BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE 205 (2007) (“America’s employers . . . aren’t conspiring to repress workers as some 
sort of sinister collective assault on the Bill of Rights. . . . [T]hey are taking what the law and 
conventional economic morality give them: the right to be reflexively suspicious of employee 
behavior that departs from managerial expectations or usual practice.”); Kevin Leo Yabut Nadal, 
Responding to Racial, Gender, and Sexual Orientation Microaggressions in the Workplace, in 2 
PRAEGER HANDBOOK ON UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 
23, 23 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 2011) (“Previous literature has suggested that while overt 
discrimination is still pervasive in present U.S. society, discrimination has taken more subtle and 
indirect forms.  Given that political correctness has become omnipresent in contemporary times, it 
is less acceptable for people to be overtly racist, sexist, or heterosexist.” (citations omitted)); 
Michael Selmi, Understanding Discrimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
833, 852 (2011) (“Discrimination has become more subtle—implicit rather than explicit—and is 
often based on expectations.”); Hila Shamir, About Not Knowing—Thoughts on Schwab and 
Heise’s Splitting Logs: An Empirical Perspective on Employment Discrimination Settlements, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 957, 960 (2011) (“The term ‘second generation employment discrimination’ 
was coined to describe the more subtle and complex forms of inequity that are evident in 
contemporary workplaces. The idea is that most employers by now know what first generation 
discrimination looks like and how to avoid certain patterns of behavior to preclude claims of 
discrimination.” (footnote omitted)). 
 213. Plass, supra note 211, at 67; see also Malveaux, supra note 2, at 94 (“In a ‘post-racial’ 
society, judges, like many Americans, may operate from the presumption that discrimination—at 
least racial discrimination—is a thing of the past.”); Kerwin Kofi Charles, A Simple Model of 
Subtle Discrimination 1–2 (Univ. of Mich. Gerald R. Ford Sch. of Pub. Policy, Paper No. 2000-
014, 1999), available at www.fordschool.umich.edu/research/papers/PDFfiles/00-014.pdf 
(“[R]ather than always being overt[,] discrimination can sometimes be subtle. . . . [I]n a world 
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one scholar concluded, “judges are not receptive to employees who believe 
that they are being treated unfairly but cannot overcome their employers’ legal 
explanations for their adverse actions.”214 
Professor Trina Jones, noting courts’ inclinations to summarily dispose of 
employment discrimination claims, posited that: 
between 1973, when McDonnell Douglas was decided, and 2009 societal 
beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination in the United States changed.  In 
1973, as the country emerged from the Jim Crow era, the presumption was one 
of widespread discrimination.  Today, in so-called “post-racial” America, an 
opposite presumption seems to exist. . . . [T]his shift influences the ways in 
which judges view discrimination claims.215 
Indeed, in an era in which this country has a biracial president and in which the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 is verging on fifty years old, the misapprehension that 
antidiscrimination law has outlived its usefulness may well have taken hold 
even among some educated people.216 
Another response to the questions of how and why employment 
discrimination shortcuts were created is that perhaps courts simply wish to 
clear their dockets.  Confronted with both a lack of personal experience with 
the discrimination alleged and the sheer number of employment discrimination 
cases on their dockets, some judges may be both afraid of opening up 
proverbial floodgates by sending too many cases to trial and inclined to see the 
allegations before them as spurious or exaggerated.  Although this is clearly 
not the case in every instance, a certain relief must accompany some judges’ 
realizations that they have a simple, though opaque, means by which to dispose 
of cases in which a certain rigid cutoff has been set.  It requires a certain 
amount of conviction and accountability for a judge to say with certainty that 
after looking at all of the relevant circumstances of a case and evidence, there 
remains no triable issue of fact in dispute, (as the Federal Rules of Civil 
 
where there is some discrimination that is not overt, societal estimates of the amount of 
discrimination in the economy will be consistently too low.”). 
 214. Plass, supra note 211, at 67. 
 215. Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril?, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 425 (2010). 
 216. See Martin, supra note 12, at 398 (noting that some judges believe that “discrimination 
does not exist or deserve policing”); Kevin Leo Yabut Nadal et al., Processes and Struggles with 
Racial Microaggressions from the White American Perspective: Recommendations for Workplace 
Settings, in 2 PRAEGER HANDBOOK ON UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING WORKPLACE 
DISCRIMINATION 155, 155 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 2011) (“With the election of President Barack 
Obama in 2008, as well as the decrease in race-based hate crimes over the past 30 years, many 
believe that racism no longer exists in American society.”); Gregory S. Parks, Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski & Richard A. Epstein, Debate, Implicit Race Bias and the 2008 Presidential Election: 
Much Ado About Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210, 211 (2009), http://www.pen 
numbra.com/debates/pdfs/ImplicitBias.pdf (stating that “[t]he blogs and the pundits all assert that 
Obama’s win means that we now live in a ‘post-racial America’”); see also supra note 210. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] SHORTCUTS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 163 
Procedure stipulate for a grant of summary judgment), and to fully explain 
why.  Shortcuts, when wielded with a broad brush, obviate the need for a judge 
to execute and to truly “own” such an analysis, and this may explain their 
appeal. 
It seems clear that the sheer number of employment discrimination cases 
wending their way through the court system has served to increase judicial 
skepticism, if not antagonism, by reinforcing the incorrect notion that 
employees tend to file frivolous claims.217  Charges filed with the EEOC have 
increased from 79,896 in 2000 to 99,922 in 2010, representing approximately a 
twenty-five percent increase,218 while civil complaints in U.S. district courts 
have increased from 263,049 in 2000 to 285,215 in 2010, representing just an 
eight percent increase.219  As Professor Margaret H. Lemos recently recounted: 
In 1993, just as the federal courts were beginning to feel the effects of the 1991 
amendments to Title VII, a former federal judge published an editorial in the 
New York Times contending that employment discrimination cases take up too 
much judicial time because they are “rarely settled, are characterized by high 
levels of acrimony and subjective claims of victimization; they are immensely 
time consuming and are controlled by legal standards that, lacking sufficient 
precision, are overgeneralized and of marginal use.”220 
Professor Stephen Plass has pointed to the open and explicit statements in 
judicial opinions, such as “[t]he motives prompting those baseless filings may 
be inferred to be harassment or intimidation with a view towards being 
 
 217. Plass, supra note 211, at 67–68 (“For some judges, the large number of charges reflect 
[sic] employees’ propensity to file frivolous claims. . . . Bad-faith filings and pressures on judicial 
resources have likely increased . . . judicial antagonism.”). 
 218. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2010, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
 219. Table C: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending 
During the 12-Month Periods Ending June 30, 2000 and 2001, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us 
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2001/jun01/c00jun01.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011); Table C: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, 
and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending June 30, 2009 and 2010, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2010/C00 
Jun10.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). 
 220. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 824 (2011) 
(quoting Kenneth Conboy, Op-Ed., Trouble in Foley Square, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1993, at A17).  
These views are held by many other judges as well.  See id. at 825 (“The Second Circuit Task 
Force on Gender, Ethnic, and Racial Fairness in the Courts found that ‘[m]any federal judges . . . 
appear to believe that the proliferation of small [employment discrimination] cases involving 
individual claimants clog up the federal courts and divert judges’ attention from larger, 
purportedly more significant, civil cases.’” (quoting John H. Doyle et al., Report of the Working 
Committees to the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the 
Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117, 343)). 
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rehired.”221  There have been several other such revelations of this belief in 
more recent judicial opinions.222  According to Professor Plass, “[j]udges are 
concerned because meritless claims not only negatively impact employers but 
also burden the judiciary” and “[judges’ belief that the claims are baseless] 
result[] in an almost routine grant of summary judgment for employers because 
employees’ bare assertions and the absence of direct evidence make it 
extremely difficult to offer proof of discrimination.”223 
In 2009, Professor Scott Moss observed that this hostility, when it is 
discernible, was largely confined to the district courts and the courts of 
appeals.224  He noted that: 
when the Supreme Court has to issue five unanimous reversals in less than a 
decade to correct most circuits as to a single body of law—employment 
discrimination—that indicates a relatively widespread problem of circuit 
hostility to that particular body of law, which constitutes a sizeable portion of 
the federal docket.  The scattered written decisions by judges openly 
expressing hostility to that area of law is further evidence, because for every 
one judge willing to go out on a limb declaring open skepticism or upset about 
 
 221. Plass, supra note 211, at 67 (quoting Edwards v. Interboro Inst., 840 F. Supp. 222, 231 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 222. Professor Scott A. Moss quoted examples from two cases, Fisher v. Vassar College and 
Rosa v. Brink’s Inc., to support his statement that “[s]ome judges express outright hostility to 
employment discrimination cases, actually mocking plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination, in fairly 
unprofessional terms, in decisions dismissing such claims.”  Scott A. Moss, The Courts Under 
President Obama, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 727, 739 & n.35 (2009).  In Fisher, the judge used a 
“literary reference to mock the idea of discrimination based on an intersection of two or more 
classes—specifically, plaintiff’s claim, and the lower court finding, of discrimination on the basis 
of Dr. Fisher’s status as a married woman: ‘How fascinating is that class / Whose only member is 
Me!’”  Id. at 739 n.35 (quoting Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1351 n.7 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(Jacobs, J., concurring)).  Similarly, in Rosa, the judge “mock[ed] the idea that a bigoted 
individual could be biased against several groups, beginning a judicial opinion dismissing an 
employment discrimination claim as follows: ‘Move over, Archie Bunker.  According to the 
plaintiff here, defendant Brink’s Inc. and three of its executives are so steeped in prejudice that 
they intentionally discriminated against her on grounds of race, national origin, gender, age, and 
disability—all at once.’”  Id. (quoting Rosa v. Brink’s Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000)).  Hostility towards employment discrimination plaintiffs has also been observed by court 
employees.  Lemos, supra note 220, at 825 (“The D.C. Circuit’s Task Force on Gender, Race, 
and Ethnic Bias reported that sixteen to seventeen percent of court employees observed ‘a judge 
treat an employment discrimination case as unimportant or a waste of time—a higher percentage 
than for any other case category apart from prisoner petitions.’” (quoting SPECIAL COMM. ON 
GEND., DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GENDER TO THE D.C. CIRCUIT 
TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS 101 (1995))). 
 223. Plass, supra note 211, at 68. 
 224. Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty 
Go Too Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 564–66 (2009). 
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employment cases, there presumably are others who hold the same view but 
have the sense of propriety not to declare so in public documents.225 
With the Supreme Court’s June 2011 decision Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes,226 in which it held that the suit, “one of the most expansive class 
actions ever,”227 could not proceed because the plaintiffs had not adequately 
set forth a common corporate pay and promotion policy giving rise to gender 
discrimination,228 scholars are now adverting to a judicial hostility toward 
employment discrimination plaintiffs that knows no such limits.229 
Scholars have suggested that legal doctrine in this area and the 
jurisprudence that applies it have become so divorced from the history and 
legacy of hatred, oppression, and exploitation that engendered it, that judges 
are not discerning discrimination where it exists.230  Judges, then, are 
considered by these scholars to view discrimination more as an isolated or 
egregious act, rather than embedded in a social or cultural context of any sort 
or somehow part of something more large scale.231  As Professor Plass states, 
“[l]egal doctrine does not require judges to evaluate whether centuries-old 
exploitative systems and practices are lurking in the shadows.”232  Moreover, 
 
 225. Id. at 565–66 (footnote omitted). 
 226. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 227. Id. at 2547. 
 228. Id. at 2556–57. 
 229. See Melissa Hart, Hostility Toward Working Women, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2011, 11:02 
AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/failing-
to-recognize-discrimination (“The most striking and disturbing thing about the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores[,] Inc. v. Dukes [sic] is the hostility evinced by the five-justice 
majority toward efforts of working women to address systemic workplace discrimination.”); 
Tanya Hernandez, Far from Random Bias, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2011, 12:21 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/wal-mart-far-
from-random-bias (“Given Wal-Mart’s size in the labor market, this court decision not only 
disserves the plaintiffs’ search for justice, it also disserves all women’s search for gender 
equality.”); Supreme Court Limits Individuals’ Access to Justice Through Procedural Rulings, 
Says Prof. Hart, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 5, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/ 
supreme-court-limits-individuals’-access-to-justice-through-procedural-rulings-says-prof-har 
(“Hart noted that the [C]ourt’s decision in Wal-Mart ‘really redefined’ the class action rule at 
issue, imposing a higher standard for overcoming the ‘threshold inquiry’ of whether to certify an 
employment discrimination class than would have been imposed on these plaintiffs in proving 
discrimination by Wal-Mart.”). 
 230. Plass, supra note 211, at 68–69 (“The problem originates partly from the fact that judges 
work primarily with legal doctrine that is detached from the slavery and post-slavery culture of 
worker exploitation.  As a result, judges do not evaluate employment discrimination cases as 
camouflaged cultural or institutional phenomena. . . .  This ahistorical approach has contributed to 
the creation and the fostering of a narrow universe of recognized employment discrimination.”). 
 231. Id. at 68 (“The rules of adjudication permit judges to reaffirm their perception that 
discrimination is a narrow practice of a few rogue employers.”). 
 232. Id. at 69. 
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he asserts, with an increasing trend toward having the more meritorious 
employment discrimination cases resolved through arbitration, the legal system 
is leaving judges more and more unclear and ignorant as to precisely what 
dynamics and interactions are occurring in the workplace.233 
Moreover, once judges undertake to adjudicate employment discrimination 
claims, it becomes clear that because each judge’s life experiences, 
sensibilities, and sympathies vary so much, and because so much discretion is 
afforded to judges by the jurisprudence, the outcomes of cases will be and have 
been wildly inconsistent.234  Scholarship has pointed to studies that reaffirm 
that aspects of one’s identity, such as one’s race, may sway or dictate one’s 
readiness to perceive discrimination in terms of its extent, pervasiveness, or 
even its existence.235  Where alternative explanations are proffered for adverse 
actions taken under circumstances where it is entirely less than clear what 
actually motivated them, this variation among individuals’ perceptions and 
constructions accounts for a lot of uncertainty and inconsistency in the law.236 
Further, some scholarship has maintained that appellate judges could be 
somehow regarding trial court judges as pro-plaintiff, and could perhaps thus 
 
 233. Id. (“As more meritorious claims get slated for arbitration, the judiciary’s perception of 
what is occurring in the workplace will become more skewed.”); cf. The Honorable Robert E. 
Payne, Austin Owen Lecture, Difficulties, Dangers & Challenges Facing the Judiciary Today, 32 
U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 900 (1998) (“If we [remember that we can be mistaken], I believe that we 
can avoid one of the biggest problems that any judicial system can have, and that is the ease with 
which judges can get out of touch with reality.  It is particularly easy for federal judges to 
succumb to that circumstance.”). 
 234. Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 499 
(2010) (“Different judges with different life experiences can be expected to view plausibility 
differently because they have a different understanding of what is ordinary, commonplace, 
natural, or a matter of common sense.”); Malveaux, supra note 2, at 92–93 (2010) (noting that 
“[b]ased on the differences among judges, one complaint may be dismissed while another 
survives, solely because of the way a judge applies his ‘judicial experience and common sense,’” 
and that “[t]he problem is not that a judge may be sympathetic or unsympathetic to discrimination 
claims, but that his personal perception, rather than the law, threatens to become outcome 
determinative”). 
 235. Malveaux, supra note 2, at 93 (“For example, studies indicate that there are significant 
differences in perception among racial groups over the existence and pervasiveness of race 
discrimination.”); see also id. at 93 n.170 (providing studies demonstrating that African 
Americans are more likely to feel like they have been discriminated against or see racism as an 
issue compared to whites). 
 236. Id. at 94 (“This perception may contribute to a judge’s concluding that intentional 
discrimination is implausible, especially in light of other alternative explanations available: 
‘Those who see discrimination as a pervasive and unjust aspect of our society are far more likely 
to interpret ambiguous events as the product of discrimination, while those who believe, or want 
to believe, that discrimination has receded in importance will attribute observed inequalities to 
forces other than discrimination.’” (quoting Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of 
Perspective Rather Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 675 (2003))). 
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try to remedy the inequality by swaying more toward the defendant.237  This 
premise that trial courts are pro-plaintiff is demonstrably false.238  Thus, 
although “[t]his appellate favoritism would be appropriate if the trial courts 
were in fact biased in favor of plaintiffs,” the fact remains that “employment 
discrimination cases constitute one of the least successful categories at the 
district court level, in that plaintiffs win a very small percentage of their 
actions and fare worse than in almost any other category of civil case.”239  An 
alternate explanation posited for appellate courts’ seeming antagonism to 
employment discrimination plaintiffs is that the operational bias is less than 
conscious, as appeals courts’ distance from the proceedings and from the 
litigants causes them to be more resistant to recognizing the harms sustained 
by plaintiffs.240 
Although there is not a significant difference between the rate of victory in 
jury trials of employment discrimination cases (37.63%) and that in other cases 
(44.41%), the rate of victory in bench trials of employment discrimination 
cases (19.62%), is substantially lower than that in other cases (45.53%).241  
While scholars believe that “in most situations juries and judges act 
similarly, . . . [i]n employment discrimination litigation, however, it may be 
that trial judges are more demanding of plaintiffs than juries are, or at least are 
exhibiting a well-founded fear of any judgments for plaintiffs being more 
likely reversed.”242 
F. A Dangerous Trend 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of Title VII is to 
ensure “that the workplace be an environment free of discrimination, where 
race [or other protected class status] is not a barrier to opportunity.”243  As 
early on as 1971, the Court observed that “the very purpose of [T]itle VII is to 
promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of 
 
 237. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 1, at 113 (noting that “[a]ppellate judges may perceive 
trial courts as pro-plaintiff” in employment discrimination cases). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  “More likely, district courts process employment discrimination cases with a neutral 
or even jaundiced eye toward plaintiffs.”  Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 130.  Another study conducted in 1996 supports the same conclusion.  See CAROL 
J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NO. NCJ 173426, BULLETIN: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, at 6 
tbl.5 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf.  According to that 
study, overall plaintiffs won 48.7% of jury trials while employment discrimination plaintiffs won 
about 47.6% of jury trials.  Id.  However, employment discrimination plaintiffs won just 26.0% of 
bench trials, a rate far less than the 61.6% won by overall plaintiffs.  Id. 
 242. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 130–31. 
 243. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009). 
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race or color,”244 proclaiming that “[t]he Act proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation.”245  The existence of shortcuts in employment discrimination law 
both undercuts and contravenes the Act’s goals and purposes.  By excusing 
courts from engaging in the reasoned analysis of all of the circumstances 
surrounding an employment discrimination case, the shortcuts bypass the 
evaluation of what really occurred in the case that “strik[ing] at the entire 
spectrum of [discrimination]” would necessitate and entail, and prematurely 
end the case’s life.246 
By leaving judges with a sense of security in the knowledge that they are 
not traversing the threshold set by the cutoffs, the shortcuts set forth clear 
periods of insulation or buffering, outside of which no insight into what may 
be one’s true character or disposition may be used against a decision maker.  
This may very well absolve a decision maker of any taint that may have 
otherwise been cast by his comment, and it thereby insulates him from the 
statute’s reach for no good reason.  This subverts the goals of Title VII. 
CONCLUSION 
It is only when the doctrines that this Article classifies as “shortcuts” are 
examined alongside one another that they are properly identified as comprising 
a larger movement of the judiciary toward foreclosing employment 
discrimination plaintiffs’ cases without the necessary analysis.  Similarly, it is 
only when these shortcuts are looked at in contrast to the inferences and 
presumptions that courts have crafted to aid tort plaintiffs that the stark 
difference between the way in which courts view and treat employment 
discrimination plaintiffs, as opposed to other plaintiffs, becomes obvious. 
Societally-held attitudes about discrimination and how rife or nefarious it 
is in today’s society can alternately influence or be reflected by judicial 
skepticism toward employment discrimination cases.  Further, judges often 
curtail or truncate employment discrimination cases’ viability prematurely at 
the summary judgment stage by improperly substituting their own evaluation 
of evidence for that of a reasonable juror, even as they invoke shortcuts that 
would likely make it unduly difficult for a plaintiff at trial in any event.  Even 
in cases in which summary judgment looks to be providently granted in light of 
the governing rules of evidence and procedure as applied to the evidence in a 
 
 244. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7247 
(1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 245. Id. at 431. 
 246. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“We have held 
that this not only covers ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense, but ‘evinces a 
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in 
employment.’” (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986))). 
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case, shortcuts can be improperly wielded by judges to forego what should be a 
transparent, reasoned analysis. 
If a judge wants to say, for example, that a comment is not relevant or 
insufficient to create a triable issue of fact, she should do so, but only after 
evaluating all of the evidence, rather than deeming the comment stray and 
summarily disposing of the case.  If a judge wants to deem a comment too 
attenuated by the passage of time to be relevant to a plaintiff’s case, she should 
do so, again, after a thorough assessment of the content and context, including 
the timing of the comment and all other relevant evidence.  If a judge wants to 
declare an act to be, as a matter of law, incapable of being called retaliatory by 
a reasonable trier, she should do so, rather than merely invoking an arbitrary 
temporal cutoff and using this cutoff to obviate a look at all relevant evidence.  
If a judge wants to hold that an actor, as a matter of law, could not have acted 
with the bias or intent alleged, she should be able to do so without resort to and 
overreliance on the fact that the actor may have hired the plaintiff.  A 
protracted passage of time between a biased comment or a protected activity 
and an adverse action may certainly attenuate the strength of evidence.  While 
some judges may still conclude that some cases, upon consideration, warrant a 
grant of summary judgment, the retraction of rigid cutoffs will require a trier of 
law, and perhaps a trier of fact as well, to review all of the evidence in a case 
before weighing in on the strength of a plaintiff’s case. 
The law of employment discrimination ought to be drawn into sharper 
focus as having its roots in torts—the law of civil wrongs.  Tort law has long 
recognized the plight of certain plaintiffs who cannot, because of their 
situation, easily establish certain elements of their cases, although the ultimate 
fact of the defendant’s liability is clear.  Employment discrimination law ought 
not, even when liability is less than clear, prematurely foreclose cases in which 
plaintiffs have often hard-to-come-by evidence of possible discrimination.  
When, however, the law permits the attaching of undue meaning to something 
as potentially innocuous as the act of hiring, or the quick affixing of a lethal 
label to evidence, it does just that. 
“Shortcuts,” applied to supplant or obviate analysis, facilitate docket 
clearing and often provide a bright line that seems to both embolden and 
comfort those who employ them.  When wielded with a heavy hand and little 
to no analysis, however, they fail to comport with the dictates of anti-
discrimination legislation, the considerations that animate tort law, and, often, 
the procedural and evidentiary rules that govern the proper disposal or 
adjudication of a case.  They also contravene the clear and broad goals of anti-
discrimination legislation and the spirit of fair, transparent, and holistic 
consideration that should be part and parcel of anti-discrimination 
jurisprudence.  Shortcuts should thus be eschewed in favor of comprehensive 
analyses in which courts have room, and indeed a mandate, to weigh—and 
explicitly weigh in on—all appropriately considered evidence of record. 
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